Talking culture : new boundaries. New rehtorics of exclusion in Europe by Stolcke, Verena
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February I995 
? I995 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved OOII-3204/95/360i-0003$2.00 
SIDNEY W. MINTZ LECTURE 
FOR I993 
Talking Culture 
New Boundaries, New Rhetorics 
of Exclusion in Europe' 
by Verena Stolcke 
In the contemporary debate concerning European integration and 
the "problem" of Third World immigration o less than in devel- 
opments in anthropology in the past decade, the boundedness of 
cultures and cultural difference have gained new prominence. An- 
thropology needs not only to explore how globalization affects 
the discipline's classical subjects but also to pay more attention 
to the new ways in which cultural differences and cleavages are 
conceptualized at its source. In effect, the political right in Eu- 
rope has in the past decade developed a political rhetoric of exclu- 
sion in which Third World immigrants, who proceed in part 
from its ex-colonies, are construed as posing a threat o the na- 
tional unity of the "host" countries because they are culturally 
different. This rhetoric of exclusion has generally been identified 
as a new form of racism. I argue, instead, that, rather than as- 
serting different endowments of human races, it postulates a pro- 
pensity in human nature to reject strangers. This assumption un- 
derlies a radical opposition between nationals and immigrants as 
foreigners informed by a reified notion of bounded and distinct, 
localized national-cultural identity and heritage that is employed 
to rationalize the call for restrictive immigration policies. Follow- 
ing a systematic omparison of the contrasting conceptual struc- 
tures of the two doctrines, I conclude that the contemporary cul- 
tural fundamentalism of the political right is, with respect to 
traditional racism, both old and new. It is old in that it draws for 
its argumentative force on the unresolved contradiction in the 
modern conception of the nation-state between an organicist and 
a voluntarist idea of belonging. It is new in that, because racism 
has become discredited politically, it attributes the alleged incom- 
patibility between different cultures to an incapacity of different 
cultures to communicate that is inherent in human nature. 
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I5 VI 94. 
Es gibt zwei Sorten von Ratten, 
die hungrigen und die satten; 
die Satten bleiben vergniigt zuhaus, 
die Hungrigen wandern aus . . . 
Oh weh, sie sind schon in der Ndh. 
HEINRICH HEINE 
Everywhere, and from now on as much in the soci- 
ety of origin as in the host society, [the immigrant] 
calls for a complete rethinking of the legitimate 
bases of citizenship and of the relationship between 
the state and the nation or nationality. An absent 
presence, he obliges us to question not only the reac- 
tions of rejection which, taking the state as an ex- 
pression of the nation, are vindicated by claiming to 
base citizenship on commonality of language and 
culture (if not "race") but also the assimilationist 
"generosity" that, confident that the state, armed 
with education, will know how to reproduce the na- 
tion, would seek to conceal a universalist chauvin- 
ism. 
PIERRE BOURDIEU 
The uniqueness of European culture, which emerges 
from the history of the diversity of regional and na- 
tional cultures, constitutes the basic prerequisite for 
European union. 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
As anthropology gradually outgrows postmodernist self- 
scrutiny and cultural self-examination and moves back 
into the real world, neither the world nor the discipline 
is any longer the same. Anthropologists have leamed to 
be more sensitive to the formidable difficulties involved 
in making sense of cultural diversity without losing 
sight of shared humanity. At the same time, the notions 
of culture and cultural difference, anthropology's classi- 
cal stock-in-trade, have become ubiquitous in the popu- 
lar and political language in which Western geopolitical 
conflicts and realignments are being phrased. Anthropol- 
ogists in recent years have paid heightened critical at- 
tention to the many ways in which Western economic 
and cultural hegemony has invaded the rest of the world 
and to how "other" cultures have resisted and reworked 
T 
i. This paper was delivered, as the I993 Sidney W. Mintz Lecture 
to the Department of Anthropology of the Johns Hopkins Univer- 
sity on November i5, I993. It is based on research conducted ir 
i99i-92 while I was a Jean Monnet fellow at the European Univer 
sity Institute in Florence. I thank especially my fellow fellows Mi 
chael Harbsmeier, Eric Heilman, and Sol Picciotto for the many 
fruitful discussions we had on the topics I raise and Ram6n Vald6& 
of the Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona for his comments or 
an earlier version. 
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these insidious influences. How these "others" are being 
politically and culturally rethought by the West, where 
the idea of cultural distinctness is being endowed with 
new divisive force, has, however, attracted surprisingly 
little interest among anthropologists. I want to address 
one major instance of contemporary culture-bounded 
political rhetoric. 
Sidney Mintz has worked for many years toward un- 
covering the logic and power of racism in systems of 
domination and exclusion in the New World. It is surely 
appropriate to focus my lecture in his honor on the re- 
surgence of essentialist ideologies in the Old World. On 
one of his trips to Paris he himself prophesied some of 
these developments more than 2o years ago, noting that, 
whereas issues of race were absent from French anthro- 
pology, in contrast with the North American variety, 
because of the different positions the discipline's sub- 
jects (internally or externally colonial) occupied in rela- 
tion to the respective national communities, France was 
beginning to experience racism as ever-growing numbers 
of immigrants arrived from its ex-colonies (Mintz I 97 I). 
The alarming spread of hostility and violence in Eu- 
rope against immigrants from the Third World has pro- 
voked much soul-searching in the past decade over the 
resurgence of the old demon of racism in a new guise. I 
want to propose, however, that a perceptible shift in the 
rhetoric of exclusion can now be detected. From what 
were once assertions of the differing endowment of hu- 
man races there has risen since the seventies a rhetoric 
of inclusion and exclusion that emphasizes the distinc- 
tiveness of cultural identity, traditions, and heritage 
among groups and assumes the closure of culture by ter- 
ritory (Soysal I993). I intend first to examine the nature 
of this shift in the way in which European anti- 
immigrant sentiment is phrased. Then I will trace the 
social and political roots and the implications of this 
new rhetoric. The formation of liberal states and notions 
of belonging has, of course, been quite different from 
one Western European country to another. History may 
explain the origins of these different political traditions, 
but it is not the cause of their continuity; each period 
interprets history according to contemporary needs. 
Therefore, I will conclude by contrasting the ways in 
which the national political repertoires of Britain and 
France have shaped and been employed to legitimate 
mounting animosity against immigrants. 
The building of Europe is a twofold process. As intra- 
European borders become progressively more permeable, 
external boundaries are ever more tightly closed.2 Strin- 
gent legal controls are put in place to exclude what have 
come to be known as extracommunitarian immigrants 
as parties of the right appeal for electoral support with 
the slogan "Foreigners Out!" There is a growing sense 
that Europeans need to develop a feeling of shared cul- 
ture and identity of purpose in order to provide the ideo- 
logical support for European economic and political 
union that will enable it to succeed. But the idea of a 
supranational culturally integrated Europe and how 
much space is to be accorded to national and regional 
cultures and identities are matters of intense dispute 
because of the challenge to national sovereignties they 
are variously felt to pose (Gallo I989; Cassen I993; 
Commission of the European Communities I987, I992). 
By contrast, immigrants, in particular those from the 
poor South (and, more recently, also from the East) who 
seek shelter in the wealthy North, have all over Western 
Europe come to be regarded as undesirable, threatening 
strangers, aliens. The extracommunitarian immigrants 
already "in our midst" are the targets of mounting hos- 
tility and violence as politicians of the right and conser- 
vative governments fuel popular fears with a rhetoric 
Df exclusion that extols national identity predicated on 
zultural exclusiveness. 
The social and political tensions that extracommuni- 
tarian immigration has provoked in a context of succes- 
3ive economic crises have been accompanied by a 
heightened concern over national cultural identities that 
has eroded the cosmopolitan hopes professed in the af- 
termath of the deadly horrors of the Nazi race policies 
f World War II. The demons of race and eugenics ap- 
?eared to have been politically if not scientifically exor- 
,ised partly by the work done by UNESCO and other 
)odies in defense of human equality in cultural diversity 
Ln the Boasian tradition after I945 (Nye I993:669; Levi- 
5trauss I978, I985; Haraway I988). Yet cultural identity 
md distinctiveness, ideas which until then seemed to 
)e a peculiar obsession only of anthropologists, have 
iow come to occupy a central place in the way in which 
inti-immigration sentiments and policies are being ra- 
;ionalized. 
There is a growing propensity in the popular mood in 
Europe to blame all the socioeconomic ills resulting 
:rom the recession and capitalist readjustments- 
anemployment, housing shortages, mounting delin- 
luency, deficiencies in social services-on immigrants 
xho lack "our" moral and cultural values, simply be- 
:ause they are there (see Taguieff I99I for a detailed 
mnalysis and challenge of these imputations in the case 
Af France.) The advocates of a halt to immigration and 
.ike-minded politicians have added to the popular ani- 
nosity toward immigrants by artificially increasing the 
5cale of the "problem." Allusions to an "immigration 
lood" and an "emigration bomb" serve to intensify dif- 
use popular fears, thereby diverting spreading social dis- 
,ontent from the true causes of the economic recession. 
Dpponents of immigration often add to this the conser- 
iative demographic argument which attributes declin- 
ng socioeconomic opportunities and poverty and the 
:onsequent desire or need to emigrate to the "population 
)omb" ticking away in the Third World, which is 
)lamed on immigrants' own improvidence. They 
;hereby mask the economic-political roots of modern 
2. One sign of the sense of urgency over immigration control is 
the informal intergovernmental bodies, such as the Trevi group of 
ministers, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, and the Schengen 
Accord, set up since the midseventies. These organizations, which 
are not accountable to the European Parliament, have served, al- 
most in secrecy, to harmonize policy among member countries 
(Bunyan I99I, Ford I99I). 
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poverty and instead justify aggressive population control 
programs whose targets are women in the poor South. 
Advocates of a halt to immigration talk of a "threshold 
of tolerance," alluding to what ethologists have called 
the territorial imperative-the alleged fact that popula- 
tions (note, among animals) tend to defend their terri- 
tory against "intruders" when these exceed a certain 
proportion estimated variously at 12-25 % because oth- 
erwise severe social tensions are bound to arise (Zungaro 
i992; Erdheim i992:i9). The media and politicians al- 
lude to the threat of cultural estrangement or alienation 
(Winkler i992, Kallscheuer i992). In other words, the 
"problem" is not "us" but "them." "We" are the mea- 
sure of the good life which "they" are threatening to 
undermine, and this is so because "they" are foreigners 
and culturally "different." Although rising unemploy- 
ment, the housing shortage, and deficient social services 
are obviously not the fault of immigrants, "they" are 
effectively made into the scapegoats for "our" socioeco- 
nomic problems. This line of argument is so persuasive 
because it appeals to the "national habitus," an exclusi- 
vist notion of belonging and political and economic 
rights conveyed by the modern idea of the nation-state 
(Elias I99I) central to which is the assumption that for- 
eigners, strangers from without, are not entitled to share 
in "national" resources and wealth, especially when 
these are apparently becoming scarce. It is conveniently 
forgotten, for example, that immigrants often do the jobs 
that natives won't. Similarly overlooked are the other- 
wise much bemoaned consequences of the population 
implosion in the wealthy North, that is, the very low 
birth rates in an aging Europe, for the viability of indus- 
trial nations and the welfare state (Below-replacement 
fertility I986, Berquo I993). The question why, if there 
is shortage of work, intolerance and aggression are not 
directed against one's fellow citizens is never raised. 
The meaning and nature of these rationalizations of 
animosity toward immigrants and the need to curb ex- 
tracommunitarian immigration have been highly con- 
troversial. I will here analyze the rightist rhetoric of ex- 
clusion rather than examining the logic of popular 
anti-immigrant resentment. Popular reactions and senti- 
ments cannot simply be extrapolated from the discourse 
of the political class. 
Immigrants: A Threat to the Cultural 
Integrity of the Nation 
In the early eighties Dummett identified a change in 
Britain in the idiom in which rejection of immigrants 
was being expressed when she drew attention to the ten- 
dency to attribute social tensions to the presence of im- 
migrants with alien cultures rather than to racism 
(Dummett and Martin i982:ioi, my emphasis; see also 
Dummett I973). As early as in the late sixties the right 
in Britain was exalting "British culture" and the "na- 
tional community," distancing itself from racial catego- 
ries and denying with insistence that its hostility toward 
immigrant communities and its call for a curb on immi- 
gration had anything to do with racism (see Asad I990 
on the idea of Britishness, constructed out of the values 
and sensibilities of the English dominant class; see also 
Dodd I986). People "by nature" preferred to live among 
their "own kind" rather than in a multicultural society, 
this attitude being, "after all," a "natural," instinctive 
reaction to the presence of people with a different cul- 
ture and origin. As Alfred Sherman, director of the right- 
wing Institute for Policy Studies and one of the main 
theoreticians of this doctrine, elaborated in I978, "Na- 
tional consciousness is the sheet anchor for the uncondi- 
tional loyalties and acceptance of duties and responsibil- 
ities, based on personal identification with the national 
community, which underlie civic duty and patriotism" 
(quoted in Barker i98i:2o; see also I979). Immigrants 
in large numbers would destroy the "homogeneity of 
the nation." A multiracial (sic) society would inevitably 
endanger the "values" and "culture" of the white major- 
ity and unleash social conflict. These were nonrational, 
instinctual fears built around feelings of loyalty and be- 
longing (Barker and Beezer I983: I25).3 As Enoch Powell 
had argued in I969, "an instinct to preserve an identity 
and defend a territory is one of the deepest and strongest 
implanted in mankind . . . and . . . its beneficial effects 
are not exhausted" (quoted in Barker i98i:22). 
Until the late seventies such nationalist claims were 
put forward only by a few (though vociferous) ideologues 
of the right who went out of their way to distance them- 
selves from the overt racism of the National Front, mor- 
ally discredited by its association with Nazi ideology. By 
the eighties, with mounting economic difficulties and 
growing animosity against immigrants, in an effort o 
gain electoral support the Tory party had adopted a dis- 
course of exclusion which was similarly infused by ex- 
pressions of fear for the integrity of the national commu- 
nity, way of life, tradition, and loyalty under threat from 
immigrants (Barker I979). One symptomatic example of 
this ideological alignment of the Tory party with its 
right is Margaret Thatcher's much-quoted statement of 
I978 that "people are really rather afraid that this coun- 
try might be swamped by people with a different culture. 
And, you know, the British character has done so much 
for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout 
the world, that if there is a fear that it might be 
swamped, people are going to react and be hostile to 
those coming in" (quoted in Fitzpatrick I987:i2i). To 
protect "the nation" from the threat immigrants with 
alien cultures posed for social cohesion, their entry 
needed to be curbed. 
3. Barker summed up the argument of what he called "the new 
racism" as follows: "Immigrants threaten to 'swamp' us with their 
alien culture: and if they are allowed in in large numbers, they 
will destroy the 'homogeneity of the nation.' At the heart of this 
'new racism' is the notion of culture and tradition. A community 
is its culture, its way of life and its traditions. To break these is 
to shatter the community. These are non-rational (and indeed, in 
the fully fledged version, instinctual), built around feelings of loy- 
alty and belonging." 
This content downloaded from 158.109.185.101 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 18:31:21 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February I995 
A similar shift in the rhetoric of exclusion has also 
been identified within the French political right. Ta- 
guieff's (I98I) is probably the most detailed, though con- 
troversial, analysis of ideological developments among 
the various tendencies of the French right since the sev- 
enties. It is controversial because the author at once 
harshly criticizes antiracist organizations for invoking, 
in their defense of immigrants' "right to difference," 
what he regards as an equally essentialist conception of 
cultural difference (see also Duranton-Crabol I988). The 
French right began orchestrating its anti-immigrant of- 
fensive by espousing what Taguieff has termed a "differ- 
ential racism," a doctrine which exalts the essential and 
irreducible cultural difference of non-European immi- 
grant communities whose presence is condemned for 
threatening the "host" country's original national iden- 
tity. A core element of this doctrine of exclusion is the 
repudiation of "cultural miscegenation" for the sake of 
the unconditional preservation of one's own original 
purportedly biocultural identity. By contrast with earlier 
"inegalitarian racism" (Taguieff's term), rather than in- 
feriorizing the "other" it exalts the absolute, irreducible 
difference of the "self" and the incommensurability of 
different cultural identities. A key concept of this new 
rhetoric is the notion of enracinement (rootedness). To 
preserve both French identity and those of immigrants 
in their diversity, the latter ought to stay at home or 
return there. Collective identity is increasingly con- 
ceived in terms of ethnicity, culture, heritage, tradition, 
memory, and difference, with only occasional references 
to "blood" and "race." As Taguieff has argued, "differen- 
tial racism" constitutes a strategy designed by the 
French right to mask what has become a "clandestine 
racism" (PP. 330-37). 
Notwithstanding the insistent emphasis on cultural 
identity and difference, scholars have tended to identify 
a "new style of racism" in the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
of the right (Barker I98I, I979; Taguieff I987; Solomos 
I99I; Wieviorka I993). Several related reasons have 
been adduced for this. Analysts in France no less than 
in Britain attribute this culturalist discourse of exclu- 
sion to a sort of political dialectic between antiracists' 
condemnation of racism for its association with Nazi 
race theories and the right's attempts to gain political 
respectability by masking the racist undertones of its 
anti-immigrant program. Besides, ordering humans hier- 
archically into races has become indefensible scientifi- 
cally (Barker I98I, Taguieff I987), and it is a mistake 
to suppose that racism developed historically only as a 
justification of relations of domination and inequality 
(Barker I98I). Lastly, even when this new "theory of 
xenophobia" (Barker 198I) does not employ racial cate- 
gories, the demand to exclude immigrants by virtue of 
their being culturally different "aliens" is ratified 
through appeals to basic human instincts, that is, in 
terms of a pseudobiological theory. Even though the 
term "race" may, therefore, be absent from this rhetoric, 
it is racism nonetheless, a "racism without race" (Rex 
I973:I9I-9.2; Balibar I99I; Solomos i99i; Gilroy I99I: 
I86-87). 
Cultural Fundamentalism: A New 
Construction of Exclusion 
The emergence of culture as "the key semantic terrain" 
(Benthall and Knight I993:2) of political discourse needs, 
however, to be more carefully explored. I want to argue 
that it is misleading to see in the contemporary anti- 
immigrant rhetoric of the right a new form of racism or 
a racism in disguise. This is, of course, no mere quibble 
over words. Not for a moment do I want to trivialize the 
sociopolitical import of this novel exaltation of cultural 
difference, but to combat the beast we need to know 
what sort it is. To this end we need to do more than 
uncover the strategic motives for the right's disavowal 
of racism and analyze the conceptual structure of this 
new political discourse and the repertoire of ideas on 
which it draws. 
A substantive conceptual shift that can be detected 
among political rightists and conservatives toward an 
anti-immigrant rhetoric predicated on cultural diversity 
and incommensurability is, in fact, informed by certain 
assumptions implicit in the modern notions of citizen- 
ship, national identity, and the nation-state. Even if this 
celebration of national-cultural integrity instead of ap- 
peals to racial purity is a political ploy, this does not 
explain why the right and conservatives, in their efforts 
to protect themselves from accusations of racism, 
should have resorted to the invocation of national-cum- 
cultural identity and incommensurability to do this. 
This culturalist rhetoric is distinct from racism in that 
it reifies culture conceived as a compact, bounded, local- 
ized, and historically rooted set of traditions and values 
transmitted through the generations by drawing on an 
ideological repertoire that dates back to the contradic- 
tory igth-century conception of the nation-state.4 
Rather than asserting different endowments of human 
races, contemporary cultural fundamentalism (as I have 
chosen to designate the contemporary anti-immigrant 
rhetoric of the right) emphasizes differences of cultural 
heritage and their incommensurability. The term "fun- 
damentalism" has conventionally been reserved for de- 
scribing antimodern, neotraditionalist religious phe- 
nomena and movements interpreted as a reaction to 
socioeconomic and cultural modernization. As I will ar- 
gue, however, the exaltation in the contemporary secu- 
lar cultural fundamentalism of the right of primordial 
national identities and loyalties is not premodern, for 
the assumptions on which it is based form a contradic- 
tory part of modernity (Dubiel i992, Klinger i992). 
There is something genuinely distinct from traditional 
racism in the conceptual structure of this new doctrine, 
which has to do with the apparently anachronistic resur- 
gence, in the modern, economically globalized world, of 
a heightened sense of primordial identity, cultural differ- 
4. See Asad (i990) for a different thematization of British identity 
that attempts to reconcile a defense of British cultural values with 
tolerance for cultural diversity in the aftermath of the Rushdie 
affair eceived with approval by liberal opinion outside the Conser- 
vative party. 
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ence, and exclusiveness. What distinguishes conven- 
tional racism from this sort of cultural fundamentalism 
is the way in which those who allegedly threaten the 
social peace of the nation are perceived. The difference 
between these two doctrines resides, first, in the way in 
which those who are their respective targets are concep- 
tualized-whether they are conceived as naturally infe- 
rior members or as strangers, aliens, to the polity, be it 
a state, an empire, or a commonwealth. Cultural funda- 
mentalism legitimates the exclusion of foreigners, 
strangers. Racism has usually provided a rationalization 
for class prerogatives by naturalizing the socioeconomic 
inferiority of the underprivileged (to disarm them politi- 
cally) or claims of national supremacy (Blanckaert I988). 
Second, whereas both doctrines constitute ideological 
themes which "naturalize" and thereby aim to neutral- 
ize specific sociopolitical cleavages whose real roots are 
economic-political, they do this in conceptually differ- 
ent ways. "Equality" and "difference" tend to be arrayed 
against each other in political discourse in both cases, 
but the "difference" which is invoked and the meaning 
with which it is endowed differ. There may be occa- 
sional references to "blood" or "race," but there is more 
to this culturalist discourse than the idea of insur- 
mountable essential cultural differences or a kind of bio- 
logical culturalism (Lawrence I982:83), namely, the as- 
sumption that relations between different cultures are 
by "nature" hostile and mutually destructive because it 
is in human nature to be ethnocentric; different cultures 
ought, therefore, to be kept apart for their own good. 
Homo xenophobicus 
A further supposition regarding human nature can, in 
effect, be found in political as well as popular discourse 
on extracommunitarian immigration in the eighties. 
Newspaper headlines, politicians, and scholars invoke 
the term "xenophobia" along with racism to describe 
mounting anti-immigrant animosity. In I984, for exam- 
ple, the European Parliament convened a committee of 
inquiry to report on the rise of fascism and racism in 
Europe in a first attempt to assess the extent and mean- 
ing of anti-immigrant hostility. In I985 the committee 
concluded that "a new type of spectre now haunts Euro- 
pean politics: xenophobophilia." The report described 
xenophobia as "a latent resentment or 'feeling,' an atti- 
tude that goes before fascism or racism and can prepare 
the ground for them but, in itself, does not fall within 
the purview of the law and legal prevention (Evregenis 
i985:6o). The components of this more or less diffuse 
feeling and of increasing tensions between the national 
and immigrant communities and their association with 
a general sense of social malaise, it was argued, were 
admittedly difficult to identify, but one element was 
"the time-honoured distrust of strangers, fear of the fu- 
ture combined with a self-defensive reflex" (p. 92). One 
outcome of the committee's work was a Declaration 
against Racism and Xenophobia made public in I986 
(European Parliament i986). In I989 the Parliament set 
up yet another committee of inquiry, this time into rac- 
ism and xenophobia. Its task was to assess the efficacy 
of the declaration and to update the information on ex- 
tra-European immigration in the light of the extension 
of freedom of movement within Europe to be introduced 
in I992-93 (European Parliament I990). The notion of 
xenophobia was thus incorporated, without any further 
attempt to dispel its ambiguities, into European Parlia- 
ment parlance. The media and politicians have equally 
picked up the idea, and it has captured the European 
imagination in general. It was this terminological inno- 
vation which first made me wonder whether there was 
not something distinct to the rhetoric of exclusion 
whereby anti-immigrant sentiment in Western Europe 
is justified.5 
"Xenophobia" literally means "hostility toward 
strangers and all that is foreign" (Le Petit Robert I967). 
Cashmore, in his I984 Dictionary of Race and Ethnic 
Relations, still dismissed the term as a "somewhat 
vague psychological concept describing a person's dispo- 
sition to fear (or abhor) other persons or groups perceived 
as outsiders" because of its uncertain meaning and 
hence its limited analytical value in that it presupposes 
underlying causes which it does not analyze; therefore, 
he thought (as it has turned out, wrongly), "it has fallen 
from the contemporary race and ethnic relations vocabu- 
lary" (P. 3I4). Either the root causes of this attitude are 
not specified or it is taken for granted that people have a 
"natural" propensity to fear and reject outsiders because 
they are different.6 The right's explicit sympathy and the 
5. Scholars have noted increasingly frequent reference to xenopho- 
bia. Because hostility toward immigrants i , in practice, selective, 
Taguieff (i987:337, my translation), for example, has argued for 
the French case that "in sum, the xenophobic attitude indicates 
only a limit; it never manifests itself in a strict sense (as the rejec- 
tion of the foreigner as such) but results from amore or less explicit 
hierarchy of rejected groups. It is not a rejection of the 'other' which 
does not choose among its 'others' and does not presuppose a set 
of values which authorize discrimination. Any xenophobia in this 
sense constitutes a latent racism, a nascent racism" (Enfin l'atti- 
tude x6nophobe n'indique qu'une limite, elle ne se manifeste ja- 
mais au sens strict (rejet de l'6tranger comme tel), mais proc6de 
d'une hierarchie plus ou moins explicite des groupes rejet6s. Il n'est 
pas de reject de "l'autre" qui ne s6lectionne parmi ses "autres," et 
ne sous-entende une 6chelle de valeurs autorisant la discrimina- 
tion. Toute x6nophobie st en ce sens un racisme latent, un racisme 
a l'6tat naissant). Taguieff therefore also disagrees (pp. 8o-8 i) with 
Levi-Strauss's celebrated though controversial distinction between 
ethnocentrism as a universal attitude of cultural self-preservation 
and creativity and racism as a doctrine that justifies oppression 
and exploitation, which gained new prominence in the French de- 
bate over immigration. Others have also interpreted xenophobic 
claims as a second-level racist discourse (Langmuir I978:i82 and 
Delacampagne i983:42-43, cited by Taguieff I987:79-80, 5og). For 
a critique of Levi-Strauss's cultural relativism see Geertz (I986). 
More recently, Todorov (i989:8i-io9) has taken Levi-Strauss to 
task for radical relativism and extreme cultural determinism. See 
also Levi-Strauss (I994:42o-26). 
6. B6jin (i986:306, my translation), for example, has asked in a 
critique of antiracists, "Why has this natural and even healthy 
ethnocentrism which has been generated in Europe in recent years 
produced expressions of exasperation? It is the antiracists them- 
selves who provide us with an adequate, even obvious answer to 
this question when they insist that allegedly 'racist' politicians 
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affinity of its argument with key postulates of human 
ethology and sociobiology have been noted repeatedly 
(Barker I98I: chap. 5; Duranton-Crabol I988:44, 7 I-8I). 
The scientific weaknesses of notions of human nature 
based on biological principles such as the territorial im- 
perative and the tribal instinct, according to which hu- 
mans no less than animals have a natural tendency to 
form bounded social groups and for the sake of their 
own survival to differentiate themselves from and to be 
hostile to outsiders have been reiterated (see, e.g., Sah- 
lins I976, Rose, Lewontin, and Kamin I984, Gould 
i98i). The point here is, however, to show why a belief 
in Homo xenophobicus has so much commonsense ap- 
peal. 
Striking in that it suggests that this assumption is 
not restricted to the scientific or political right is, for 
example, Cohn-Bendit and Schmid's (I99I:5, my trans- 
lation) recent argument that "the indignation over xeno- 
phobia (Fremdenhass), which suggests as an antidote a 
policy of open borders, is somehow false and dangerous. 
For if history has taught us one thing, then it is this: in 
no society has a civil intercourse with foreigners been 
inbred. Much indicates that the reserve vis-a'-vis the for- 
eigner constitutes an anthropological constant of the 
species: and modernity with its growing mobility has 
made this problem more general than it was before."7 
This claim is as politically dangerous as it is scientifi- 
cally debatable, for history, by contrast, for example, 
with biology, is unable to prove human universals, at 
least as far as our contemporary understanding of the 
human experience goes. Besides, it is not difficult to 
come up with examples demonstrating the fallacy of the 
idea that xenophobia is part of the human condition. 
The war in Bosnia provides probably the most tragic con- 
temporary instance. Until Serbian radical nationalism 
tore them apart, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats had lived 
together as neighbors in their acknowledged religious 
and other cultural differences. 
Xenophobia, an attitude supposedly inherent in hu- 
man nature, constitutes the ideological underpinning of 
cultural fundamentalism and accounts for people's al- 
leged tendency to value their own cultures to the exclu- 
sion of any other and therefore be incapable of living 
side by side. Contemporary cultural fundamentalism is 
based, then, on two conflated assumptions: that differ- 
ent cultures are incommensurable and that, because hu- 
mans are inherently ethnocentric, relations between 
cultures are by "nature" hostile. Xenophobia is to cul- 
experience an increase in their audiences under conditions and in 
regions where there is a strong, important, and, in the event of 
apathy on the part of the 'corps social,' irreversible influx of immi- 
grants of extra-European origin. They thus acknowledge, I presume 
involuntarily, that this exasperation is a reaction of defense by a 
community which senses that its identity is threatened, a reaction 
which presents analogies with the resistance this or that occupa- 
tion by foreign armed forces has provoked in the past. This rejec- 
tion might even, if international tensions intensify, become more 
profound as immigrants concentrate, modifying in a more irrevers- 
ible way a country's identity than would occupation forces, which 
do not intend to settle and reproduce" (Pourquoi cet ethnocen- 
trisme naturel et meme sain s'est-il traduit, au cours des ann6es 
r6centes en Europe, par des manifestations d'exasp6ration? Ce sont 
les antiracistes eux-memes qui nous donnent la r6ponse ad6quate, 
d'ailleurs 6vidente, a cette question quand ils soulignent que les 
politiciens uppos6s 'racistes' voient leur audience s'accroitre dans 
les conjonctures et les r6gions oii s'est produit un brutal, important 
et-en cas d'apathie du corps social-irr6versible afflux d'immi- 
gr6s d'origine extra-europeenne. Ils reconnaissent ainsi, involon- 
tairement je suppose, que cette exasp6ration est une reaction de 
defense d'une communaut6 qui percoit son identit6 comme men- 
ac6e, r6action qui pr6sente des analogies avec la r6sistance que telle 
ou telle occupation par des forces arm6es 6trangeres a pu susciter 
dans le pass6. Ce rejet pourrait meme, sui devaient s'exacerber les 
tensions internationales, 'averer plus profond ans la mesure oii 
des immigr6s qui font souche modifient plus irr6mediablement 
l'identit6 d'un pays que des occupants qui ne cherchent pas a s'y 
enraciner et s'y reproduire). A British writer defines xenophobia 
as "a dislike for foreigners or outsiders . . . an old and familiar 
phenomenon in human societies" (Layton-Henry I99I:I69). 
7. "Die Entrustung uber den Fremdenhass, die als Gegenmittel ine 
Politik der schrankenlos offenen Grenzen empfiehlt, hat etwas 
scheinheiliges und Gefahrliches. Denn wenn die Geschichte irgend 
etwas lehrt, dann dies: Keiner Gesellschaft war je der zivile Um- 
gang mit den Fremden angeboren. Vieles spricht dafuir, dass die 
Reserve ihm gegeniuber zu den anthropologischen Konstanten der 
Gattung ehort; und die Moderne hat mit ihrer steigenden Mobili- 
tat dieses Problem allgegenwartiger gemacht als zuvor. Wer dies 
leugnet, arbeitet der Angst vor dem Fremden und den aggressiven 
Potentialen, die in ihr schlummern, nicht entgegen." Cohn-Bendit 
is the head of the Department of Multicultural Affairs of the city 
of Frankfurt, and Schmid is his assistant. This article was written 
in support of a shift in immigration policy by the Greens toward 
a system of immigration quotas (see also Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 
i992 for a more careful argument). Enzensberger (I992:I3-I4, my 
translation, emphasis added) has similarly argued that "every mi- 
gration, independent of its causes, its aims, whether it be voluntary 
or involuntary, and its magnitude, leads to conflicts. Group 
selfishness and xenophobia constitute anthropological constants 
which precede any rationalization. Their universality suggests 
that they are older than any known form of society. Ancient soci- 
eties invented taboos and rituals of hospitality in order to contain 
them, to prevent recurrent bloodbaths, to allow for a modicum 
of exchange and communication between different clans, tribes, 
ethnicities. These measures do not, however, eliminate the status 
of alien. On the contrary, they institutionalize it. The guest is 
sacred but may not stay" (Jede Migration fuhrt zu Konflikten, unab- 
hangig davon, wodurch sie ausgelost wird, welche Absicht ihr zu- 
grunde liegt, ob sie freiwillig oder unfreiwillig eschieht und 
welchen Umfang sie annimmt. Gruppenegoismus und Fremden- 
hass sind anthropologische Konstanten, die jeder Begriindung vor- 
ausgehen. Ihre universelle Verbreitung spricht dafiir, dass sie alter 
sind als alle bekannten Gesellschaftsformen. Um sie einzudam- 
men, um dauernde Blutbader zu vermeiden, um uAberhaupt ein 
Minimum von Austausch und Verkehr zwischen verschiedenen 
Clans, Stammen, Ethnien zu ermoglichen, haben altertiumliche 
Gesellschaften die Tabus und Rituale der Gastfreundschaft erfun- 
den. Diese Vorkehrungen heben den Status des Fremden aber nicht 
auf. Sie schreiben ihn ganz im Gegenteil fest. Der Gast ist heilig, 
aber er darf nicht bleiben.) Another way of naturalizing what can 
be shown to be historically determined attitudes by universalizing 
them consists in arguing that racism is universal. Thus Todorov 
(i989:I14, my translation) has argued that racism as a form of 
behavior, as opposed to racialism as a pseudoscientific doctrine, is 
"an ancient behavior and probably a universal one; racialism is a 
current of opinion born in Western Europe whose heyday extends 
from the i 8th to the middle of the 2oth century" (Le racisme est un 
comportement ancien, et d'extension probablement universelle; le 
racialisme est un mouvement d'id6es n6 en Europe occidentale, 
dont la grande p6riode va du milieu du XVIIIe au milieu du XXe 
siecle). 
This content downloaded from 158.109.185.101 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 18:31:21 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
S T O L C K E Talkink Culture | 7 
tural fundamentalism what the bio-moral concept of 
"race" is to racism, namely, the naturalist constant that 
endows with truth value and legitimates the respective 
ideologies. 
Racism versus Cultural Fundamentalism 
A systematic comparison of the conceptual structures 
of traditional racism and this cultural fundamentalism 
may render clearer the distinctness of what are alterna- 
tive doctrines of exclusion.8 They have in common that 
they address the contradiction between the modern uni- 
versalist notion that all humans are naturally equal and 
free and multiple forms of sociopolitical discrimination 
and exclusion, but they do so differently. Both doctrines 
derive their argumentative force from the same ideologi- 
cal subterfuge, namely, the presentation of what is the 
outcome of specific politico-economic relationships and 
conflicts of interest as natural and hence incontestable 
because it, as it were, "comes naturally." 
Modern Western racism rationalizes claims of na- 
tional superiority or sociopolitical disqualification and 
economic exploitation of groups of individuals within a 
polity by attributing to them certain moral, intellectual, 
or social defects supposedly grounded in their "racial" 
endowment which, by virtue of being innate, are inevi- 
table. The markers invoked to identify a "race" may be 
phenotypical or constructed. Racism thus operates with 
a particularistic criterion of classification, namely, 
"race," which challenges the claim to equal humanness 
by dividing humankind into inherently distinct groups 
ordered hierarchically, one group making a claim to ex- 
clusive superiority. In this sense racist doctrines are cat- 
egorical, concealing the sociopolitical relationships 
which generate the hierarchy. "Race" is construed as the 
necessary and sufficient natural cause of the unfitness 
of "others" and hence of their inferiority. Sociopolitical 
inequality and domination are thereby attributed to the 
criterion of differentiation itself, namely, "their" lack of 
worth, which is in "their" race. As a doctrine of asym- 
metric classification racism provokes counterconcepts 
that demean the "other" as the "other" could not de- 
mean the "self." Mutual recognition is denied precisely 
because the "racial" defect, being relative, is not shared 
by the "self." And that is the point. By attributing un- 
equal status and treatment to its victim's own inherent 
shortcomings, this doctrine denies the ideological char- 
acter of racism itself. 
Of course, this raises the important question of the 
place of an idea of social status inscribed in nature, 
rather than resulting from contract, in modern society, 
otherwise conceived of as composed of self-determining 
individuals born equal and free. Modern racism consti- 
tutes an ideological sleight-of-hand for reconciling the 
irreconcilable-a liberal meritocratic ethos of equal op- 
portunity for all in the marketplace and socioeconomic 
inequality-which, rather than being an anachronistic 
survival of past times of slavery and/or European colo- 
nial expansion and the ascriptive ordering of society, is 
part and parcel of liberal capitalism (Stolcke I993, Fitz- 
patrick I987). 
At different moments in history systems of inequality 
and oppression have been rationalized in distinct ways. 
Racist doctrines are only one variation of the same 
theme, namely, the endeavour to reconcile an idea of 
shared humanity with existing forms of domination. 
Early modern colonial encounters with "primitives" in- 
tensely exercised European minds. Initially it was not 
their "racial" difference which haunted the European 
imagination but their religious-cum-moral diversity 
which was felt to challenge Christian hegemony. How, 
if God had created "man" in his image, could there be 
humans who were not Christians? Nineteenth-century 
scientific racism was a new way of justifying domina- 
tion and inequality inspired by the search for natural 
laws that would account for the order in nature and soci- 
ety. Striking in the igth-century debate over the place 
of humans in nature is the tension between man's faith 
in free will unencumbered by natural constraints, in his 
endeavour as a free agent to master nature, and the ten- 
dency to naturalize social man. Social Darwinism, eu- 
genics, and criminology provided the pseudoscientific 
legitimation for consolidating class inequality. Their 
targets were the dangerous laboring classes at home (see, 
e.g., Chevalier I984). If the self-determining individual, 
through persistent inferiority, seemed unable to make 
the most of the opportunities ociety purported to offer, 
it had to be because of some essential, inherent defect. 
The person or, better, his or her natural endowment-be 
it called racial, sexual, innate talent, or intelligence- 
rather than the prevailing socioeconomic or political or- 
der was to be blamed for this. This rationale functioned 
both as a powerful incentive for individual effort and to 
disarm social discontent. Physical anthropology at the 
same time lent support both to claims of national su- 
premacy among European nations and to the colonial 
enterprise by establishing a hierarchy of bio-moral races 
(Blanckaert I988; Brubaker i992:98-io2). 
Cultural fundamentalism, by contrast, assumes a set 
of symmetric ounterconcepts, that of the foreigner, the 
stranger, the alien as opposed to the national, the citi- 
zen. Humans by their nature are bearers of culture. But 
humanity is composed of a multiplicity of distinct cul- 
tures which are incommensurable, the relations be- 
tween their respective members being inherently con- 
flictive because it is in human nature to be xenophobic. 
An alleged human universal-people's natural propen- 
sity to reject strangers-accounts for cultural particular- 
ism. The apparent contradiction, in the modern liberal 
democratic ethos, between the invocation of a shared 
humanity which involves an idea of generality so that 
no human being seems to be excluded and cultural par- 
ticularism translated into national terms is overcome 
ideologically: a cultural "other," the immigrant as for- 
eigner. alien. and as such a notentin1 "enemv" who 
8. I draw here on Koselleck's (i985) important analysis of political 
counterconcepts. 
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threatens "our" national-cum-cultural uniqueness and 
integrity, is constructed out of a trait which is shared 
by the "self." In yet another ideological twist, national 
identity and belonging interpreted as cultural singularity 
become an insurmountable barrier to doing what comes 
naturally to humans, in principle, namely, communicat- 
ing. 
Instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, 
cultural fundamentalism segregates them spatially, each 
culture in its place. The fact that nation-states are by no 
means culturally uniform is ignored. Localized political 
communities are regarded by definition as culturally ho- 
mogeneous. Presumed inherent xenophobic propensi- 
ties-though they challenge the supposed territorial 
rooting of cultural communities, since they are directed 
against strangers "in our midst"-reterritorialize cul- 
tures. Their targets are uprooted strangers who fail to 
assimilate culturally. 
Being symmetrical, these categories are logically re- 
versible-any national is a foreigner to any other nation 
in a world of nation-states, for to possess a nationality 
is in the nature of things. This formal conceptual polar- 
ity-nationals as against foreigners-is charged with po- 
litical meaning. By manipulating the ambiguous link be- 
tween national belonging and cultural identity, the 
notion of xenophobia infuses the relationship between 
the two categories with a specific and substantive politi- 
cal content. Because the propensity to dislike strangers 
is shared by foreigners, it also becomes legitimate to fear 
that the latter, by their disloyalty, might threaten the 
national community. When the "problem" posed by ex- 
tracommunitarian immigration is conceptualized in 
terms of self-evident cultural difference and incommen- 
surability, the root causes of immigration, namely, the 
deepening effects of North-South inequality, are ex- 
plained away. 
Cultural fundamentalism invokes a conception of cul- 
ture contradictorily inspired both by the universalist En- 
lightenment radition and by the German romanticism 
that marked much of the igth-century nationalist de- 
bate. By building its case for the exclusion of immigrants 
on a trait shared by all humans alike rather than on 
an unfitness allegedly intrinsic to extracommunitarians, 
cultural fundamentalism, by contrast with racist theo- 
ries, has a certain openness which leaves room for re- 
quiring immigrants, if they wish to live in our midst, to 
assimilate culturally. And because of the other impor- 
tant idea in modern Western political culture, namely, 
that all humans are equal and free, anti-immigrant rhet- 
oric is polemical and open to challenge, which is why 
existing forms of exclusion, inequality, and oppression 
need to be rationalized ideologically. 
At the core of this ideology of collective exclusion 
predicated on the idea of the "other" as a foreigner, a
stranger, to the body politic is the assumption that for- 
mal political equality presupposes cultural identity and 
hence cultural sameness is the essential prerequisite for 
access to citizenship rights. One should not confuse the 
useful social function of immigrants as scapegoats for 
prevailing socioeconomic ills with the way in which im- 
migrants as foreigners are conceptualized. Rather than 
being thematized directly, immigrants' socioeconomic 
exclusion is a consequence of their political exclusion 
(Le temps des exclusions I993). Opponents of immigra- 
tion on the right may object to granting immigrants the 
social and political rights inherent in citizenship on eco- 
nomic grounds. The "problem" of immigration is con- 
strued, however, as a political threat to national identity 
and integrity on account of immigrants' cultural diver- 
sity because the nation-state is conceived as founded on 
a bounded and distinct community which mobilizes a 
shared sense of belonging and loyalty predicated on a 
common language, cultural traditions, and beliefs. In a 
context of economic recession and national retrench- 
ment, appeals to primordial loyalties fall on fertile 
ground because of the ordinary taken-for-granted sense 
of national belonging that is the common idiom of 
contemporary political self-understanding (Weber I976, 
cited by Brubaker i992). 
Immigrants are seen as threatening to bring about a 
"crisis of citizenship" (Leca I992:3I4)9 in both a juridi- 
cal and a politico-ideological sense. In the modern world 
nationality as the precondition for citizenship is inher- 
ently bounded as an instrument and an object of social 
closure (Brubaker i992).10 In this respect, nationality is 
not all that different from the kinship principles that 
operated in so-called primitive societies to define group 
membership. In the modern world of nation-states, na- 
tionality, citizenship, cultural community, and state are 
conflated ideologically (Beaud and Noiriel I99I:276) and 
endow immigrants' cultural distinctiveness with sym- 
bolic and political meaning. 
It will, of course, be objected that not all immigrants 
or foreigners are treated with animosity. This is obvi- 
ously true. But then, equality and difference are not ab- 
solute categories. The politico-ideological repertoire on 
which the modern nation-state is built provides the raw 
materials from which cultural fundamentalism is con- 
structed. Specific power relationships with the countries 
from which extracommunitarian immigrants proceed 
and the exploitation they have undergone explain why 
"they" rather than, for example, North Americans are 
the targets in Europe of this rhetoric of exclusion. Hos- 
tility against extracommunitarian immigrants may have 
racist overtones, and metaphors can certainly be mixed. 
Yet, as somebody remarked to me recently, immigrants 
carry their foreignness in their faces. Phenotype tends 
now to be employed as a marker of immigrant origin 
rather than "race's" being construed as the justification 
for anti-immigrant resentment. 
9. Leca distinguishes two ways of defining nationality as a prerequi- 
site for citizenship, namely, in "biological" and in "contractual" 
terms, but regrettably does not pursue the politico-ideological im- 
plications of these distinct modalities. 
io. Brubaker ightly remarks on the surprising absence of studies 
of the modern concept of citizenship in the social sciences. 
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French Republican Assimilation versus 
British Ethnic Integration 
For the sake of clarity I have so far neglected major dif- 
ferences in dealing with the immigration "problem" 
among European countries which have been pointed out 
repeatedly (Wieviorka I993; Rouland I993:I6-I7; La- 
peyronnie I993). "It is an almost universal activity of 
the modern state to regulate the movement of the people 
across its national boundaries" (Evans I983:4), but this 
can be done in diverse ways. The Dutch and the British 
governments were the first to acknowledge the presence 
in their countries of so-called ethnic minorities. By the 
eighties all Western European states were curbing immi- 
gration and attempting to integrate immigrants already 
in their midst. Depending on their political cultures and 
histories, different countries designed their immigration 
policies differently. The French model, informed by the 
traditional Republican formula of assimilation and civic 
incorporation, contrasted sharply with the Anglo-Saxon 
one, which left room for cultural diversity, although by 
the eighties a confluence could be detected between the 
two countries' anti-immigrant rhetoric and restrictive 
policies. 
The entry and settlement of immigrants in Europe 
poses again the question of what constitutes the modern 
nation-state and what are conceived as the prerequisites 
for access to nationality as the precondition for citizen- 
ship. Three criteria-descent (jus sanguinis), birthplace 
(jus soli), and domicile combined with diverse proce- 
dures of "naturalization" (note the term)-have usually 
been wielded to determine entitlement o nationality in 
the modern nation-states. [us sanguinis constitutes the 
most exclusive principle. The priority given historically 
to one or another criterion has depended not only, how- 
ever, on demographic-economic and/or military cir- 
cumstances and interests but also on conceptions of the 
national community and the substantial ties of nation- 
hood. The classical opposition between the French 
Staatsnation and the German Kulturnation (Meinecke 
I919; Guiomar i99o:i26-3o) has often obscured the es- 
sentialist nationalism present also in i gth-century 
French thought and debate on nationhood and national 
identity and hence the part played by the Republican 
formula of assimilation in the French conception of the 
Republic." There has been almost from the start a ten- 
sion between a democratic, voluntarist, and an organi- 
cist conception of belonging in the continental European 
model-by contrast with the British tradition-of the 
modern nation-state which, depending on historical cir- 
cumstances, has been drawn on to formulate and ratio- 
nalize a more or less exclusive idea of the nation and of 
citizenship. A comparison of French and British postwar 
experiences and treatments of the immigration "prob- 
lem" will serve to make this point (see Lapeyronnie 
I993 for a different interpretation). 
The French debate over immigration since the sevent- 
ies reveals the ambivalence underlying the Republican 
assimilationist conception of nationality and citizen- 
ship. The first genuine French nationality code was en- 
acted in I889, at a time when foreigners, predominantly 
of Belgian, Polish, Italian, and Portuguese origin, had a 
large presence in the country, by contrast with Ger- 
many, and drew a sharp line between nationals and for- 
eigners.12 It consecrated the jus sanguinis, that is, de- 
scent from a French father (sic) and, in the case of an 
illegitimate child, from the mother, as the first criterion 
of access to French nationality, but simultaneously it 
reinforced the principle of jus soli, according to which 
children of foreigners born on French soil were automat- 
ically French (Brubaker I992:94-II3, I38-42; see also 
Noiriel I988:8I-84). The relative prominence given to 
jus soli in the code has been interpreted as a "liberal," 
inclusive solution (Noiriel I988:83; Brubaker i992). On 
closer inspection this combination of descent and birth- 
place rules can also be interpreted, however, as a clever 
compromise struck for military and ideological reasons 
(in the context of the confrontation over Alsace-Lorraine 
following the French defeat in the Franco-German War 
and the establishment of the German Empire) between 
an organicist and a voluntarist conception which, 
though contradictory, were intrinsic to the French con- 
ception of the nation-state. 
The nationality code of I889 did not apply to the 
French colonies until French citizenship was extended 
to all colonial territories after World War II (Werner 
I935). As soon as Algeria gained its independence, how- 
ever, Algerians became foreigners, while inhabitants of 
the French overseas departments and territories re- 
mained fully French, with right of entry into France. 
Those Algerians who were living in France at indepen- 
dence had to opt for French or Algerian citizenship. For 
obvious political reasons most of them rejected French 
nationality, though their French-born children contin- 
ued to be defined as French at birth, as were the French- 
born children of the large numbers of immigrants to 
France in the decade following the war of independence 
(Weil i988). By the midseventies the regulation of 
French nationality and citizenship became inseparable 
from immigration policy. As opinion grew more hostile 
toward immigrants, especially from North Africa, the 
jus soli came under increasing attack from the right for 
turning foreigners into Frenchmen on paper without en- 
i i. By distinguishing between "ethnic moments" (understood as 
racist) and "assimilationist moments" in igth-century French for- 
mulations of nationality law, Brubaker (i992:esp. chap. 5), in his 
otherwise informative comparative study of citizenship in France 
and Germany, disregards the fundamentalist assumption on which 
the assimilationist idea rests, namely, that formal egal equality 
among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity. 
I 2. The term etranger had already been introduced uring the glori- 
ous revolution to designate political enemies, traitors to the revolu- 
tionary cause-the French nobility plotting against the patriotes 
and the British suspected of conspiring to reimpose royal rule in 
Paris. This association of the etranger with disloyalty to the nation 
has been especially powerful in times of war (Wahnich I988). 
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suring that they were "French at heart" (Brubaker i992: 
I43). A controversial citizenship law reform submitted 
in I983 and designed to abolish the automatic acquisi- 
tion of French nationality by French-born children of 
immigrants, requiring an explicit declaration instead, 
was nevertheless defeated in I986 because of strong op- 
position to the traditional French assimilationist con- 
ception by proimmigrant organizations and the left. In 
I993 the new conservative government finally suc- 
ceeded, however, in passing a reform to the same effect, 
which restricts the jus soli rule, thereby giving new 
prominence to jus sanguinis.13 
Until the mideighties the antiracist movement and 
proimmigrant organizations in France had advocated a 
multiculturalist model of integration based on respect 
for immigrants' cultural diversity, responding thus to 
the right's cultural fundamentalism. The heated debate 
over immigrants' "right to difference" was typically 
French.'4 Thereafter progressive opinion began to swing 
around, calling for "a return to the old republican theme 
of integration according to which membership in the 
nation is based not on an identity but on citizenship, 
which consists in individual adherence to certain mini- 
mal but precise universal values" (Dossier I99I:47- 
48).15 The "republican model of integration" which con- 
ditions citizenship on shared cultural values and 
demands cultural assimilation became the progressive 
political alternative to the right's cultural fundamental- 
ism. 16 
British immigration debate and experience developed 
quite differently. According to the traditional national- 
ity law of England, later extended to Britain, every per- 
son born within the domain of its king was a British 
subject. Nineteenth-century French advocates of jus 
sanguinis had already rejected as inappropriate the Brit- 
ish unconditional jus soli rule because for them citizen- 
ship reflected an enduring and substantial rather than 
merely accidental connection to France as well as the 
will to belong and because of its expansiveness and feu- 
dal roots (Brubaker i992:90). But the meaning and con- 
sequences of jural norms depend on their historical con- 
text. The traditional British concept of subjecthood 
based on birth on British soil, which established an indi- 
vidual vertical bond of allegiance to the crown and its 
parliament, unaltered until i962, allowed immigrants 
from the colonies free entry into the country as British 
subjects regardless of their cultural and/or phenotypical 
difference.'7 The Home Office (quoted by Segal i99i:9) 
argued in the I930S as follows: 
it is a matter of fundamental importance both for 
the United Kingdom and for the Empire as a whole, 
if there is to be such an organization at all based in 
the last resort on a common sentiment of cohesion 
which exists, but cannot be created, that all British 
subjects should be treated on the same basis in the 
United Kingdom.... It is to the advantage of the 
United Kingdom that persons from all parts of the 
Empire are attracted to it. 
Despite postwar concerns over free and unrestricted im- 
migration's lowering the quality of the British people 
(Dummett and Nicol I990:I74), the British Nationality 
Bill of I948 ruled that British subjecthood was acquired 
by virtue of being a citizen of a country of the Common- 
wealth. Yet, as large numbers of immigrants arrived and 
demands for control increased, the Commonwealth Im- 
migrants Act of i962 introduced the first special immi- 
gration controls. It did not explicitly discriminate 
against nonwhite immigrants, but it left a large amount 
of discretion for immigration officers to select immi- 
grants at a time when it went without saying that Com- 
monwealth immigrants were not white (Dummett and 
Nicol 1990:183-87; Segal i99i:9). In I98I, finally, the 
Conservative government passed the British Nationality 
Act, which brought nationality law in line with immi- 
gration policy and limited the ancient unconditional jus 
soli, concluding the process of "alienation" of New 
Commonwealth immigrants by transforming them into 
aliens (Evans I983:46; Dummett and Nicol I990:238- 
5 '). Those who had been hostilized earlier as "black sub- 
jects" are now excluded as "cultural aliens."''8 
I 3. It should be noted that Charles Pasqua, the Gaullist French 
minister of the interior who drafted the reform, was also a staunch 
opponent of the Maastricht agreement and European political inte- 
gration during the campaign in France for its approval by referen- 
dum. Pasqua explained his opposition by arguing revealingly, "In 
France, the right to vote is inseparable from citizenship and this 
from nationality. There are 5 million foreigners here, I.5 million 
of them communitarians. Our communitarian guests are welcome, 
but we are not willing to share our national sovereignty with them. 
France is an exceptional people and not an amalgam of tribes" (El 
Pais, September I4, I992, P. 4). The Euro-sceptics in the British 
Conservative party are similarly concerned with European integra- 
tion's challenging British sovereignty. 
I4. Guillaumin (1i992:89) points to an important political distinc- 
tion between claiming " a right to difference," which implies an 
appeal by immigrants for authorization by the state to be different 
from nationals, by contrast with postulating "the right of differ- 
ence," which assumes a universal, inherent right. 
I5. This dossier provides extensive coverage of the French debate 
on immigration from an assimilationist perspective. See also 
"Quels discours sur l'immigration?" (i988) for an earlier, con- 
trasting view which focuses critically on the reform of French na- 
tionality law in the eighties. 
i6. In I99I the socialist govemment set up a Ministry of Social 
Affairs and of Integration and a State Secretariat for Integration to 
promote immigrants' assimilation (Perroti and Th6paut i99i:io2). 
I 7. In the late sixties the former liberal Tory home secretary Regi- 
nald Maulding revealingly argued that "while one talked always 
and rightly about the need to avoid discrimination between black 
and white it is a simple fact of human nature that for the British 
people there is a great difference between Australians and New 
Zealanders, for example, who come of British stock, and people of 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Indian Sub-Continent who are 
equally subjects of the Queen and entitled to total equality before 
the law when established here, but who in appearance, habits, 
religion and culture were totally different from us. The problem 
of balancing the moral principle of non-discrimination with the 
practical facts of human nature was not an easy one, and the dan- 
gers that arise from mistakes of policy in this field were very real 
indeed" (quoted by Evans i983:2I, my emphasis). 
i8. In I969 Enoch Powell was proposing a Ministry of Repatriation 
and referring toCommonwealth immigrants a  "aliens" in the cul- 
tural sense (Dummett and Nicol i990:i96). 
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Britain's common law tradition and the absence of a 
code of citizenship rights had provided space for immi- 
grant subjects' cultural values and needs. Tolerance for 
cultural diversity formed part of the history of Britain, 
acknowledged as a multicultural polity, until in the late 
seventies an English-centric reinvention of that history 
began to prevail (Kearney i99I; Clark I99Ia, b). This 
does not mean that Britain's postwar immigration expe- 
rience was not beset with social conflict. Anti- 
immigrant sentiment was alive and aggressions were 
frequent, but they were racist. Until the late seventies 
the controversy over immigration was predominantly 
phrased in racist terms. As Dummett and Nicol (I990: 
2I3)19 have pointed out, 
Just as the advocates of strict immigration control 
were exclusively concerned with non-white immigra- 
tion, so the supporters of liberalisation attacked ra- 
cial discrimination first and foremost and perceived 
immigration policy as the driving force behind this 
discrimination. It had become psychologically impos- 
sible for both sides to think of "immigration" in any 
sense, or any context, except as a verbal convention 
for referring to the race situation in Britain. 
Legal provisions to combat discrimination typically 
aimed at ensuring subjects from the ex-colonies equal 
opportunities independent of their "race."20 As long as 
immigrants from the ex-colonies were British subjects 
they were fellow citizens, albeit considered as of an infe- 
rior kind. Anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination 
were rationalized in classical racist terms. Formal legal 
equality was not deemed incompatible with immi- 
grants' different cultural traditions as long as these tradi- 
tions did not infringe basic human rights. The right's 
demand for cultural assimilation constituted a minority 
opinion. Liberals defended integration with due respect 
for cultural diversity and the particular needs of "eth- 
nic" minorities. A key instrument of liberal integration 
policy was multicultural education. As I have shown 
above, when the Tory government took up the banner 
of curbing immigration it began to rationalize it, invok- 
ing, by contrast with earlier racist arguments, national- 
cum-cultural unity and calling for the cultural assimila- 
tion of immigrant communities "in our midst" to 
safeguard the British "nation" with its shared values and 
lifestyle. Immigrant communities needed to be broken 
up so that their members, once isolated, would cease to 
pose a cultural and political threat to the British nation. 
Immigrant children were to receive standard English ed- 
ucation, and uniform legal treatment was to be accorded 
them (Parekh I99i). Thus as Europe evolved into a su- 
pranational polity, a continental nation-state paradoxi- 
cally emerged out of the ashes of the British multicul- 
tural though racist empire. 
The Nation within the State 
As I indicated earlier, the debate over immigrants' "right 
to difference" unleashed singular passions in France. 
The character and reasons for this controversy transcend 
the polarized political climate over the immigration 
"problem." They express a historical tension inherent 
in the French universalist Republican conception of the 
modern nation-state. In a world of emerging nation- 
states, the early cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit was 
soon eroded by a crucial dilemma, namely, how to build 
a nation-state ndowed with a distinct and bounded citi- 
zenry. Ethnic group differences were, in principle, alien 
to the revolutionary democratic point of view. But, as 
Hobsbawm (I990:I9, see also Cranston I988:IOI) has 
identified the problem, 
The equation nation = state = people, and espe- 
cially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation 
to territory, since structure and definition of states 
were now essentially territorial. It also implied a 
multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this 
was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self- 
determination.... But it said little about what con- 
stituted "the people." In particular there was no logi- 
cal connection between a body of citizens of a 
territorial state, on one hand, and the identification 
of a "nation" on ethnic, linguistic or other grounds 
or of other characteristics which allowed collective 
recognition of group membership. 
The advocates of an idea of the "nation" based on a 
freely entered contract among sovereign citizens usually 
invoke Renan's celebrated metaphor "The existence of 
a nation is a plebiscite of every day." Renan's "Qu'est-ce 
qu'une nation?" (i992 [i882])21 is in fact often taken for 
the expression of a conception of the nation particularly 
well suited to modern democratic individualism.22 They 
tend to overlook, however, that Renan simultaneously 
uses another culturalist argument to resolve the dif- 
ficulty of how to circumscribe the "population" or 
I 9. The voluminous British literature on "race relations" is another 
indication of the prominence of racism in relation to immigrants. 
2o. To outlaw racial discrimination in public places, housing, and 
employment, successive British governments passed a series of 
Race Relations Acts in I965, I968, and I976 (Dummett and Nicol 
I990, Layton-Henry I99I, Parekh i99i). The I976 Race Relations 
Act repealed earlier laws and created the Commission for Racial 
Equality, an administrative body responsible for implementing the 
equal opportunities policies laid down in the act (Lustgarten I980, 
Jenkins and Solomos I987, Walker and Redman I977). 
2i. It is important o note that Renan wrote this essay at the time 
of the Franco-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine, claimed by 
Germany on the grounds that its population was of German culture 
and spoke the German language. 
22. It is worth noting here that Louis Dumont is among those who 
have neglected the organicist elements in Renan when he contrasts 
that scholar's writings with those of Herder and Fichte and goes 
on to establish an unwarrantedly sharp opposition between French 
voluntarist heory and the German ethnic conception (Dumont 
I979; also i99i). 
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"people" entitled to partake in this plebiscite (i992 Conclusion 
L-QQQ1 c A. 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things 
which in reality make up no more than one consti- 
tute that soul, that spiritual principle. One is in the 
past, the other in the present. One is the shared pos- 
session of a rich heritage of memories; the other is 
the present consent, the desire to live together, the 
will to continue to sustain the heritage one has re- 
ceived undivided.... The nation, the same as the in- 
dividual, is the realization of an extended past of en- 
deavors, of sacrifice and of devotion. The cult of the 
ancestors is among all the most legitimate; the an- 
cestors have made us what we are.... 
Two contradictory criteria, one political (free consent) 
and one cultural (a shared past), are thus constitutive 
of the "nation" (Todorov I989:I65-26i; Noiriel I9:27- 
28; see also Gellner i987:6-28 for a different, function- 
alist interpretation and, for a witty take-off on French 
republican mythology, Gatty I 99 3). Renan's difficulty in 
defining the "nation" in purely contractual, consensual 
terms is just one illustration of a fundamental dilemma 
that has beset continental European state building. The 
"principle of nationality," which identified the state, 
the people, and the law with an ideal vision of society 
as culturally homogeneous and integrated, became the 
novel, though unstable, form of legitimation in igth- 
century struggles for state formation. 
Contemporary cultural fundamentalism unequivo- 
cally roots nationality and citizenship in a shared cul- 
tural heritage. Though new with regard to traditional 
racism, it is also old, for it draws for its argumentative 
force on this contradictory igth-century conception of 
the modern nation-state. The assumption that the terri- 
torial state and its people are founded on a cultural heri- 
tage that is bounded, compact, and distinct is a constitu- 
tive part of this, but there is also, as I have argued, an 
important conceptual difference. Nineteenth-century 
nationalism received enormous reinforcement from the 
elaboration of one central concept of social theory, 
"race." With heightened enmity between nation-states, 
nationalism was often activated and ratified through 
claims to racial superiority of the national community. 
Because racist doctrines have become politically discred- 
ited in the postwar period, cultural fundamentalism as 
the contemporary rhetoric of exclusion thematizes, in- 
stead, relations between cultures by reifying cultural 
boundaries and difference. 
To conclude, let me now return to the tasks and tribula- 
tions of anthropology. Social and cultural anthropology 
have had a privileged relationship with culture and cul- 
tural differences. The critical, self-reflexive turn in the 
past decade in anthropology has rightly called into ques- 
tion the political and theoretical implications of the 
taken-for-granted boundedness and isolation of cultures 
in classical ethnographic realism. There is no longer a 
generally accepted view of cultures as relatively fixed 
and integrated systems of shared values and meanings. 
Enhanced "postmodern" awareness of cultural complex- 
ities and cultural politics and of the situatedness of 
knowledge in poststructuralist anthropology entails, 
however, a paradox. Despite pronouncements to the 
contrary, "culture critique," no less than the cultural 
constructionist mode, by necessity presupposes the sep- 
arateness of cultures and their boundedness (Kahn 
I989).24 Only because there are "other" ways of making 
sense of the world can "we" pretend to relativize "our 
own" cultural self-understandings. Similarly, when a 
systematic knowledge of "others" as much as of "our- 
selves" is deemed impossible, this is so because "we" no 
less than "others" are culture-bound. Thus, the present 
culturalist mood in anthropology ends up by postulating 
a world of reified cultural differences (see Gupta and 
Ferguson i992, Keesing I994, Turner I993). Parallels be- 
tween this and cultural fundamentalism, as I have ana- 
lyzed it above, should make us beware of the dangers, 
for furthering understanding between peoples, of a new 
sort of cultural relativism. 
Not for a moment do I mean to deny different ways 
of organizing the business of life and different systems 
of meaning. Humans have, however, always been on the 
move, and cultures have proved fluid and flexible. The 
new global order, in which both old and new boundaries, 
far from being dissolved, are becoming more active and 
exclusive, poses formidable new questions also for an- 
thropology. A crucial issue that should concern us is, 
then, the circumstances under which culture ceases to 
be something we need for being human to become some- 
thing that impedes us from communicating as human 
beings. It is not cultural diversity per se that should 
interest anthropologists but the political meanings 
with which specific political contexts and relationships 
endow cultural difference. Peoples become culturally 
entrenched and exclusive in contexts where there is 
domination and conflict. It is the configuration of 
sociopolitical structures and relationships both within 
and between groups that activates differences and 
shapes possibilities and impossibilities of communicat- 
ing. In order to make sense of contemporary cultural 
politics in this interconnected and unequal world, we 
need transcend our sometimes self-serving relativisms 
and methodological uncertainties and proceed to ex- 
23. "Une nation est une ame, un principe spirituel. Deux choses 
qui, a vrai dire n'en font qu'un, constituent cette ame, ce principe 
spirituel. L'une est dans le pass6, l'autre dans le pr6sent. L'une est 
la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est 
le consentement actuel, le d6sir de vivre ensemble, la volont6 de 
continuer a faire valoir l'h6ritage qu'on a recu indivis. . . . La 
nation, comme l'individu, est l'aboutissant d'un long pass6 d'ef- 
forts, de sacrifices et de devouements. Le culte des ancetres est de 
tous les plus 1egitime; ancetres nous ont faits ce que nous som- 
mes." 
24. Kahn, however, commits the error I discussed earlier of inter- 
preting cultural essentialism as a form of racism. 
This content downloaded from 158.109.185.101 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 18:31:21 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
S T O L C K E Talking Culture I I 3 
plore, in a creative dialogue with other disciplines, "the 
processes of production of difference" (Gupta and Fergu- 
son I992:I3-I4). 
Genuine tolerance for cultural diversity can flourish 
without entailing disadvantages only where society and 
polity are democratic and egalitarian enough to enable 
people to resist discrimination (whether as immigrants, 
foreigners, women, blacks) and develop differences with- 
out jeopardizing themselves and solidarity among them. 
I wonder whether this is possible within the confines of 
the modern nation-state or, for that matter, of any state. 
Comments 
JONATHAN BENTHALL 
Royal Anthropological Institute, 5o Fitzroy St., 
London WIP 5HS, England. 2I vII 94 
I am delighted that Stolcke finds anthropology to be 
growing out of its estrangement from reality, for surely 
the alternative would have been seclusion in some twi- 
light home. As Alex de Waal has recently put it, "An- 
thropology deals with issues of immediate importance, 
and its practitioners have a greater role than they may 
realize" (de Waal I994:28). 
Stolcke suggests that doctrinal racism, which posits a 
hierarchy of merit, has been neutralized, but it has prob- 
ably gone underground to appear in new forms. The con- 
cept of genetic distance, which appears to put the people 
of Africa on a genealogical branch of their own, has not 
yet surfaced in political discourse but could easily be 
thus abused. The growing tendency, too, of some anthro- 
pologists (following through the intellectual conse- 
quences of Darwinism) to blur rather than sharpen the 
difference between human beings and other primates 
could lead politically not only to more serious consider- 
ation of the "rights" of chimpanzees and gorillas but 
also to an erosion of the concept of human rights and a 
return-such as the right is always hankering for-to 
the more traditional oyalties of kin, ethnicity, and reli- 
gion. Again, an intra-African racist doctrine, the Hami- 
tic hypothesis, was disseminated through the republish- 
ing of old anthropological texts in Britain well into the 
I970S and, according to de Waal, bears some indirect 
responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda. Constant pro- 
fessional vigilance is needed. 
To go back in history, the consequences of nazi race- 
science are known to all, but is it widely remembered 
that anthropological knowledge is enshrined in the Mu- 
nich Agreement of I938 on the Sudetenland issue? The 
agreement stipulated that whereas the "predominantly 
German" territory of Czechoslovakia was to be occupied 
immediately by German troops, a commission of repre- 
sentatives of the four Big Powers would arrange for pleb- 
iscites in the regions "where the ethnographical charac- 
ter was in doubt"-a pledge that was never in fact 
carried out (Shirer Ig64:s Ion). 
Stolcke's comparative analysis of the immigration de- 
bate in Britain and in France is useful, and she is original 
and, I think, accurate in noting the recent revival of "xe- 
nophobia" as an explanatory term. She is also surely 
correct in declaring that it has no scientific basis. Minor 
weaknesses in an otherwise closely argued paper emerge 
in the claim that the "root causes" of immigration are 
the deepening "effects" of North-South inequality (trac- 
ing the chain of causation back to an abstraction which 
itself needs explanation) and in a somewhat limp con- 
clusion which appears to imagine polity without a state. 
To press Stolcke's argument a little further, it would 
appear likely that steps taken to try to reduce North- 
South inequalities-for instance, through any campaign 
for more frugal iving in the North-will have the effect 
of aggravating economic recession in the North and con- 
sequent protectionism and xenophobia. There will 
surely be a dialectical relationship between political 
campaigns on behalf of the South and revivals of neo- 
Poujadism. 
With regard to the nation-state, opposition to the 
"cultural fundamentalism" diagnosed by Stolcke leads 
necessarily to a critique of ethno-nationalism. But since 
so few actual nation-states are monoethnic and the con- 
sequences of breaking up multiethnic states into small 
entities appear to be frequently so disastrous, many 
commentators conclude that large nation-states can do 
more good than harm, particularly in protecting the se- 
curity of minorities. The last seven words of Stolcke's 
lecture suggest that she wants all state power to be 
weakened, which sounds utopian. 
PIETRO CLEMENTE 
Via Napoli 7, 53 IOO Siena, Italy. 30 vII 94 
Stolcke's essay is bold and stimulating. It covers many 
of anthropology's trouble spots and examines their rela- 
tionship to current trends in contemporary thought. 
While I do not concur with all aspects of her thesis, I 
admire its ambition. I appreciate the essay's civil and 
political passion and its anthropological approach to 
macroscopic analytical objects. I strongly approve of 
both the use of unusual sources (such as the reports of 
the European Community and the political-judicial de- 
bates on nationality and citizenship) and the reconstruc- 
tion of French and British tendencies in the past decade 
regarding national identity and its relationship to immi- 
gration. 
The theses of Taguieff and the French debate on "dif- 
ferential racism" are well known in Italy. While many 
share Taguieff's viewpoint, I find it more appropriate to 
focus on the workings of "excess identity," Stolcke's 
"cultural fundamentalism." I do not, however, agree 
about its alarming political implications. To begin with, 
I have some difficulty with the depiction of so general- 
ized a left and a right. In addition, it seems unfair to 
attribute refined traditions of thought such as those of 
Franz Boas and Hans-Georg Gadamer to a right wing 
whose statements are generally rough and prosaic. My 
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own research has contributed to the rediscovery of their 
local and historical identity of people who had aban- 
doned rituals and customs in the confrontation with 
advancing modernization. I myself have assessed the 
cultural patrimony of craftsmen and country folk, 
defending their tutelage in the name of the concept of 
"cultural heritage." The current debate raises the ethical 
question whether through my work I have fostered cul- 
tural fundamentalism in myself and in others, on the 
one hand resisting anomie and the loss of identity and 
historical memory to the urbanized world but on the 
other hand contributing to the creation of barriers to 
new cultural encounters. I believe I can say that every- 
one needs cultural "roots" of dialect, symbolic form, 
identity, and that these are not what produces xeno- 
phobia. 
Italy is a nation crisscrossed throughout by inter- 
nal territorial differentiation. Its strength is more pro- 
nounced on the local than on the national level. The 
theme of a "cultural homeland" was dear to our most 
noted postwar scholar, Ernesto De Martino, who linked 
it with the necessary "critical ethnocentrism" of the an- 
thropologist (De Martino I977). The dean of our African 
studies, Bernardo Bernardi (I994), reproposes the notion 
of "ethnocentrism," which, following both W. G. Sum- 
ner and De Martino, he considers the basis for under- 
standing of the collective workings of encounter, ex- 
change, and cultural mixing. Stolcke would probably 
object to the use of Italy as a case in point. Here the 
nationalistic platform of the right is not very sophis- 
ticated: it has relaunched liberal modernism, its 
Reaganism needs no culturalist finesse, and the rightist 
tendencies of the territorial leagues which seek to create 
a Republic of Northern Italy bypass cultural issues in 
favor of financial ones. Criticism of the new cultural 
fundamentalism could apply to regional or ethnic move- 
ments (Occitanists, Sardists, Altoatestins, and others) 
and the new localisms which sometimes tend to build 
myths of origin and unmixed purity, but these are not 
on the agenda in the political debate that Stolcke is deal- 
ing with. 
Stolcke's critique is also very useful for certain spe- 
cific fields of anthropological work, for example, immi- 
gration research in urban areas. In this case it is helpful 
to begin with the understanding that the immigrant is 
an individual who oscillates between two worlds and is 
stimulated to change. Contact with the values, rules, 
and heritage of this ancient and oppressive world of ours 
is for many people of underpriviledged societies a libera- 
tion and an opportunity to develop new configurations. 
I have always liked Frantz Fanon's expression "envision 
the universe through the particular." This "particular," 
in my opinion, is a matter of memory and tradition and 
not necessarily one of nation. Stolcke is essentially con- 
cerned with national identity, and perhaps I approach 
the subject from a different position. It may nevertheless 
be interesting to conclude with a model of an identity 
that oscillates between foreigner and "cultural patriot" 
(as De Martino would put it). Being a foreigner may in- 
volve cosmopolitanism, moving in and out of cultures 
exchanging and gaining enough experience to be able to 
use the proverb "The whole world is a town." Foreign- 
ers' main limitation is lack of cultural identity; simply 
put, they do not exist culturally, as in the model of 
Christian sainthood: they are foreigners in this world 
because they are part of another one. Having a "cultural 
homeland" as a place of memories, affection, roots, 
allows for a less abstract rendering of the notion of hu- 
mankind and of the individual in society, but there is 
no tradition, heritage, or memory that does not admit 
of intermixing. By oscillating between these two poles 
and learning by trial and error, one sees where the world 
is going. In a vision of Utopia the "cultural homeland" 
and the universalists' "world of men" might coincide, 
as in the beautiful anarchist song: "Our homeland is the 
entire world, our law is liberty." But these are not times 
for dreams. 
PETER FITZPATRICK 
Darwin College, University of Kent at Canterbury, 
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NY, England. 3 VIII 94 
Some supplements, not all of them dangerous, to Stol- 
cke's rich and revelatory account: For a start, the cul- 
tural fundamentalism of European rhetorics of exclusion 
is inherently untenable. It entails, as Stolcke indicates, 
an essential relation between being and culture and an 
absolute incommensurability between cultures. To be 
valid in their own terms, these nostrums of cultural fun- 
damentalism can only be of a culture. They cannot be, as 
they assert, of all cultures. Being bounded by a distinct 
culture, we cannot know that we know or do not know 
other cultures-and, what is particularly delicious, we 
cannot know that people of other cultures do not know 
us. 
Then there may be possibilities of virtue in incom- 
mensurability. Not all notions of incommensurability 
are founded on the mutual hostility and oppression that 
typify cultural fundamentalism. The European Enlight- 
enment and its Romantic aftermath which Stolcke 
evokes did have representatives, Diderot and Herder, for 
example, who advanced incommensurability as a benign 
counter to colonialism and slavery. And is there not 
honor here in anthropology also? 
Stolcke sees cultural fundamentalism as distinct and 
perhaps even taking over from racism. In this, nation 
becomes the locus of culture. It seems difficult o me to 
make this claim without saying more about the history 
of racism-about its persistence and protean forms. 
There are many indications in the paper that cultural 
fundamentalism in its exclusion and oppression of the 
stranger may be a form of racism, and there are intima- 
tions that racism exceeds Stolcke's subordination of it 
to a support for nationalism. 
As Stolcke recognises, not all strangers are equally 
strange. Indeed, the proponents of cultural fundamental- 
ism have little or no trouble accepting the representa- 
tives of some cultures. Yet in Stolcke's argument, the 
xenophobia that founds cultural fundamentalism is, un- 
like racism, uniform and comprehensive in its opposi- 
tion to all other cultures. In this scheme cultures relate 
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to each other in ways that are non-hierarchical or simply 
spatial. In the first slice of cultural fundamentalism that 
Stolcke provides, however, Thatcher's evocation to such 
political effect of the threat of "swamping" by "people 
with a different culture," what seems crucial is the exac- 
titude, the territorial precision, with which such people 
are designated in Thatcher's speech just before the part 
used by Stolcke: these potential swampers are "people 
of the New Commonwealth" [that is, "black" people] or 
"Pakistan"-which country had to be specifically added 
because it had left the Commonwealth. Such people so 
carefully specified are then counterposed to "the British 
character" which "has done so much for democracy, for 
law, and done so much throughout the world." Divi- 
sions of this kind, as Stolcke aptly notes, provide the 
"cultural" unity and uniformity of the nation, a nation 
which in reality contains a diversity of cultures. They 
"reterritorialize cultures." Such divisions are racist 
rather than non-hierarchical or simply spatial. It may 
help to note, with Bhabha (I994:99-IOO), that "etymo- 
logically . . . 'territory' derives from both terra (earth) 
and terrree (to frighten) whence territorium, 'a place 
from which people are frightened off."' Only some are 
ostracized, degraded, murdered, or, in short, terrorized. 
The claims of nation also extend beyond the non- 
hierarchical and the simply spatial, beyond being merely 
the locus of one culture among many. Nationalism in 
the igth century served to mark off a collectivity of cer- 
tain nations as exemplary of the universal and as the 
impetus of all that was becoming universal. That eleva- 
tion was and still is effected in racist terms. The ex- 
cluded are now also invited as nations to come within 
the realm of the universal and the exemplary. To accom- 
modate the ambivalent identity that results from the 
call to be the same and the exclusion as different, na- 
tions and cultures are stretched between various polari- 
ties-the developed and the underdeveloped, the normal 
and the backward, the usual list. The excluded serve to 
organise and classify the world along a spectrum ranging 
from the most "advanced" liberal democracies to barely 
coherent nations always about to slip into the abyss of 
ultimate alterity. 
ALEX STEPICK 
Immigration and Ethnicity Institute, Florida 
International University, Miami, Fla. 33 I99, U.S.A. 
28 VII 94 
While those who study immigration in anthropology are 
increasingly calling for a transnational approach (e.g., 
Glick-Schiller and Basch i992, Glick-Schiller, Basch, 
and Szanton Blanc I994), the political right insists on 
the opposite-the need for and alleged naturalness of 
cultural, along with political, boundaries. The contradic- 
tion is not merely coincidental. Miami spawned the 
contemporary bilingual-education movement in the 
mid-ig60s, and in I980 it spearheaded the English-only 
backlash that subsequently swept through all the states 
with significant Spanish-speaking minorities (Castro 
1992). A more distinct dialectic could not be imagined 
as the forces creating and promoting a multilingual envi- 
ronment produced a reaction from those who resented 
and contested the transformation. 
Stolcke compellingly argues that the contemporary 
political movement on the right that rationalizes immi- 
gration restrictions on the basis of cultural fundamental- 
ism is racism in a new and different garb. It remains 
racism because its targets are the same, those commonly 
glossed as "people of color." It is different from racism, 
however, in that its justification is not biological but 
cultural. She concludes by beseeching anthropologists 
not to commit the same logical and political error as the 
cultural fundamentalists-not to submit to a fundamen- 
tal cultural relativism that reifies cultural difference 
rather than seeking even if incompletely to understand 
and overcome it. We anthropologists hould reclaim cul- 
tural studies from nonanthropologists and incorporate 
the insights of postmodern awareness of cultural com- 
plexities and politics to address issues of domination, 
conflict, and culture. 
Contests over power and meaning expose the fragile 
and superficial nature of cultural consensus and har- 
mony. Cities undergoing rapid, integral reformations of- 
fer insights. Miami is one such city. In the early I98os, 
those with power and influence, the local elite, were all 
white Americans. They lived in a city that had quickly 
become heavily Latino following Castro's Cuban revolu- 
tion and the subsequent U.S.-sponsored migration of 
nearly io% of Cuba's population. Most immigrants et- 
tled in Miami and with the help of generous U.S. bene- 
fits and the experience and capital they brought with 
them quickly established a successful immigrant en- 
clave. Most white Americans welcomed these primarily 
white, middle-class, well-educated, state-sponsored im- 
migrants even as they bemoaned the new immigrants' 
continuation of their cultural differences, their propen- 
sity to speak Spanish in public, and their right-wing, 
sometimes violent politics. Yet, they expected that 
these immigrants would be like other, earlier white im- 
migrants in assimilating to American culture, soon 
speaking only English in public, ignoring the politics of 
their homeland in favor of those of their new locale, and 
buying white-American products and services. 
Through the I98os, Cubans rapidly ascended to posi- 
tions of power and influence. They became the majority 
on the city council. They entered the state legislature. 
They became top developers and builders. Soon the 
white Americans admitted them to the most influential 
clubs and committees. Yet, the new immigrants had not 
assimilated as quickly or as thoroughly as the white 
American elite had envisioned. Many still spoke Spanish 
in public, and these were not the parking lot attendants 
but those whose cars were being parked, not the busboys 
and waitresses but those ordering the food, not the un- 
skilled workers but those who owned the companies. 
The Miami Herald played a key role in reflecting and 
shaping a profound transformation of dominant white 
American attitudes. Cultural concerns dominated its 
discourse, but the rapid loss of subscribers who no 
longer wanted an English-only newspaper also heavily 
influenced the Herald's position. During the mid- and 
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late i980s, the discourse of the Herald and prominent 
white American leaders changed. Rather than suggesting 
that Cubans would soon assimilate, white American 
leaders applauded the multicultural mix that permitted 
Miami to become the capital of the Caribbean and even 
all of Latin America. Spanish-speakers, in this new vi- 
sion, were central to Miami's prosperity in that they 
provided smooth business links to the region's primary 
trading partners (Portes and Stepick I993). Not all cul- 
tural diversity was so championed. Black Haitian immi- 
grants never received the welcome accorded white Cu- 
bans. Instead, the U.S. government repeatedly and 
relentlessly sought to deter Haitians' arrival and per- 
suade those in Miami to return home (Stepick i992). 
Race and power, so inextricably melded in the United 
States and apparently in Europe, determine where the 
boundaries are drawn-who is welcomed as a member 
of the cultural and political community and who is ex- 
cluded. Culture plays an independent, critical role in 
both discourse and action. Cubans were conceived as 
different and treated differently because they spoke 
Spanish and much of their political attention was di- 
rected to their homeland. Yet, those differences were 
tolerated at first because the U.S. federal government 
provided resources to ameliorate the costs of addressing 
them and later because those whose economic base re- 
mained in South Florida had no choice but to accept 
them. Those who could not do so either fled or resisted 
by founding the English Only movement. Black immi- 
grants, in contrast, could never obtain sufficient power 
to effect their incorporation into the local community. 
Much like the native African Americans, they remain 
marginal, appealing to the American ideology of equal 
treatment regardless of race and succeeding enough to 
permit the formation of a Haitian community but not 
enough to provide it with the firm, powerful base that 
Cubans enjoy. 
Thus, culture and power determine the evolution of 
community-who is included or excluded. The shallow 
history of South Florida and of all the United States 
compared with Europe precludes a deeply organic con- 
ception of the nation-state. Cultural markers must be 
used, and they can easily be extended or withdrawn and 
are always contested in response to the emerging power 
of new groups. Yet, race remains foremost. While racism 
may be discredited politically and no longer admissible 
in public discourse, it continues to guide the policies of 
people. 
MARILYN STRATHERN 
Department of Social Anthropology, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RF, England. 3 vIII 94 
This is an important paper. By her careful historical exe- 
gesis, Stolcke makes it very difficult for the anthropolo- 
gist to dismiss what she so aptly calls "cultural funda- 
mentalism" as no more than a misguided manifestation 
of racist thinking. On the contrary, she points out all 
the ways in which cultural discrimination has become 
a phenomenon in itself. In one sense this is what anthro- 
pologists have always wanted-not the particular reifi- 
cations, of course, which they feel they have outgrown 
(cultures as bounded, internally coherent wholes, etc.), 
but its objectification, that is, culture as an object of 
thought (their understanding of what gives identity and 
distinctiveness to human lives). The openness of the 
concept of culture, as she points out, makes it disarm- 
ingly "friendly" to use, appealing to human universals 
in apparently non-exclusionary terms; after all, we "all" 
have culture. This is the benign sense in which anthro- 
pologists have promoted it. The importance of Stolcke's 
historical work lies in elucidating its role as an idiom of 
exclusion-the new possibilities it affords for what can 
be uttered in public. Culture has become all too utterable. 
It is interesting that along with the emphasis on the 
socially constructed nature of loyalties subsumed under 
appeals to culture goes an emphasis on a primordial or 
natural state of affairs. Far from appearing as contradic- 
tory or opposed, both "nature" and "culture" carry weight 
in the way the new exclusions are framed. It is the congru- 
ence or conflation of these that gives cultural fundamen- 
talism such power-a demonstration that in turn gives 
power to Stolcke's argument. This is a brilliant exposition 
and, as one would expect from the author, an anthropolog- 
ical project directed towards a pressing social issue. Its 
significance is not to be underestimated. 
The only comment to make is that if the strength of 
the paper lies in its social contextualization (Stolcke is 
ascribing these ideas not to some vague "culture" but 
to specific policies and practices) one would not want 
to be carried (reassured?) by the idea that cultural funda- 
mentalism is a right-wing plot. It may be very useful 
for right-wing political language, but such politics also 
draws on usages more generally current. Although one 
should not underplay the differences between European 
governments that she sketches, dogmas of cultural dif- 
ference (and she makes this apparent) suit a whole spec- 
trum of positions. Thus, as we might expect to find in the 
Ig80s/I990s, they suit both right-wing and left-wing 
platforms. While immigration policies may offer particu- 
lar evidence of right-wing political thinking, they hold 
water precisely because of their saliency. Indeed, cultural 
fundamentalism is too flexible a concept by far for com- 
fort. As she says, it is new and old at the same time, as it 
gathers to itself both social constructionist heories and 
ideas about natural bonds and universal human traits and 
facilitates ideologies of assimilation and integration 
alike. Different political regimes speak in its common 
language. Anthropologists have had their hand in this: 
Stolcke's demonstration is both edifying and disturbing. 
rERENCE TURNER 
Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 
Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A. 23 vIII 94 
Stolcke's article makes important points about the na- 
ture of the cultural nationalism currently being champi- 
:ned by the European right. I think she is right to em- 
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phasize the differences between the new "cultural 
fundamentalism" and racism while recognizing that 
both reflect, in different ways, the contradiction in ear- 
lier forms of liberal nationalism between universalistic 
values and the need to limit the nation to its territorial 
boundaries. I also agree with her that it is essential for 
anthropology to take account of the ways in which the 
new political movements and conditions to which she 
refers are changing the meaning of "culture" and to re- 
flect on the implications of these changes for its own 
theoretical concept of culture. In this connection, she is 
correct, in my view, to stress that recent anthropological 
formulations in the postmodernist "culture-critique" 
vein only recast in different terms and do not transcend 
the reification of cultural difference typical of older an- 
thropological approaches to cultures as bounded iso- 
lates. 
While Stolcke's discussion contains important in- 
sights into the new cultural nationalism, she does not 
claim to present an exhaustive account of the phenome- 
non or an analysis of its political and social causes. Tak- 
ing her stimulating treatment as a point of departure, I
would suggest that a fuller analysis would address issues 
such as the following: 
First, cultural nationalism is not merely or even pri- 
marily exclusionary and xenophobic, and the foreign im- 
migrants and Gastarbeiter towards whom it is ostensi- 
bly directed are not its primary targets. It is a claim 
for inclusion and integration on more favorable social, 
political, and economic terms directed at dominant 
political and technobureaucratic groups by relatively 
disenfranchised, dominated elements of the national 
population. This is why the new cultural nationalist 
movements cannot simply be understood as expressions 
of the political right, even though it is the right that has 
effectively co-opted them. What must also be accounted 
for is their populist character as the social and political 
protests of subordinate social strata against the domi- 
nant political-economic and cultural order that excludes 
them from full participation in the national life. In this 
wider perspective the implicit ultimate end of these 
movements is not the "cultural cleansing" of the nation 
through the expulsion of foreigners but their own fuller 
integration into and more equitable participation in the 
social and economic life of the nation. Opposition to 
foreigners and immigrants is an apt means to this end 
because foreign migrants and guest-workers are the most 
visible, accessible, and vulnerable extension of the hege- 
monic political and technoeconomic system that the 
protesters feel oppresses and excludes them. Calling for 
the exclusion of foreign elements on nationalist grounds 
is a convenient way of stressing the common ground 
the protesters hare with the dominant elements of the 
national society-the bureaucracy and the political lead- 
ership-and thus gaining moral leverage over them to 
compel them to take more account of the protesters and 
their demands. 
Any attempt to understand the new forms of cultural 
and ethnic nationalism must account for the fact that 
while xenophobic cultural fundamentalism is becoming 
a right-wing populist idiom of protest by lower-class and 
marginal elements of European national societies, an of- 
ten equally fundamentalist multiculturalism is becom- 
ing the preferred idiom in which minority ethnic and 
racial groups are asserting their right to a full and equal 
role in the same societies. These groups and movements 
overtly assert their cultural, ethnic, and/or national 
"identities" as the legitimizing basis of claims to inclu- 
sion on an equal footing in multiethnic national societ- 
ies (or, in extreme cases, claims to separate existence as 
independent nations) rather than as calls for the exclu- 
sion of culturally different groups. Rightist exclusionist 
cultural nationalism and left-oriented inclusionist 
mnulticulturalism, I suggest, should be understood as 
complementary refractions of the same conjuncture of 
social and political-economic forces. 
There are two fundamental reasons that cultural iden- 
tity has emerged as the idiom of choice for expessions 
of social discontent by marginalized or downwardly mo- 
bile elements of national populations. The first is that 
it is virtually the only aspect of their relation to the 
national society that they still own and control-the 
only one, by the same token, beyond the control of na- 
tional political and cultural elites. The second is the 
political potency of the conception of national identity 
intrinsic to modern European nationalism from its ori- 
gins in the i8th and igth centuries. As Stolcke points 
out, both the liberal republican (French) and reactionary 
culturalist (German) forms of nationalism rested on a 
conception of national identity as the expression of a 
distinctive historical and cultural heritage shared 
zqually by all individual members of the national com- 
munity. The result has been to legitimize a cultural 
3ense of national identity not only as an inalienable 
property of every individual, and hence beyond the con- 
trol of elites, but also as the justification for political 
Alaims made in the name of the nation and the unifor- 
mity of its legal norms or social mores. 
What is now happening is that subordinate and mar- 
3-inal elements of the national societies of Europe are 
not for the first time) picking up this ideological 
weapon and using it against the hegemonic liberal estab- 
Lishments and state governments that have presided 
wver the erosion of their economic and social condition 
n the recent period of the consolidation of transnational 
:apitalism. The responses of national establishments to 
-he protests of the "cultural fundamentalists" have of- 
-en ironically reflected the assertions of the protesters, 
is when multiculturalist claims are resisted by cultural 
iuthorities in the name of the need for cultural unifor- 
nity as the basis of national political integration. 
In the past, similar movements of nationalist "funda- 
nentalism," such as fascism, have seized upon race or 
)ther issues as the specific vehicles of their causes. Stol- 
,ke is correct to stress the relative uniqueness of the 
,urrent wave of "culturalist" movements in this re- 
;pect. The question is why "culture" in the contempo- 
ary sense of a common "identity" or universe of dis- 
,ourse and social standards rather than "race" or even 
SYemeinschaft in the older German sense of a historic 
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folk community has now become the focus of the new 
movements. The answer is to be found in the dominant 
socioeconomic conditions of the historical period in 
which the new movements have emerged. 
As the governments of nation-states are increasingly 
redefined as local committees of an ever more power- 
fully organized transnational capitalist system of finan- 
cial institutions, labor movements, circulating capital, 
and commodity flows, their political and economic in- 
stitutions become increasingly inaccessible to influence 
by the mass of their populations. As the traditional 
meaning of political citizenship withers away under 
these circumstances, the ability of national regimes to 
guarantee their citizens access to commodity consump- 
tion on a scale commensurate with their social aspira- 
tions has become their primary basis of political legiti- 
mation. Consumption of commodities has thus 
supplanted the exercise of the traditional political func- 
tions of citizenship as the main mode of the construc- 
tion-and thus control-of personal identity. The indi- 
vidualistic form of this identity construction, however, 
is limited and oriented by the social values of the na- 
tional society; it thus constitutes a cultural form of par- 
ticipation in the national identity, the form that now 
provides the most immediate and satisfying sense of 
power over the terms of personal and social existence. 
Cultural identity and national cultural identity as its 
most fundamental, socially shared aspect thus become 
the most politically fraught idiom of solidarity and pro- 
test alike in contemporary capitalist societies. 
What are the implications of these developments for 
the anthropological concept of culture? First and most 
obvious, "culture" cannot be theorized in isolation from 
the social conditions in which it arises and vice versa. 
Secondly, the attempt to do so, characteristic of most 
anthropological theorizing about culture from the Bo- 
asians to the contemporary proponents of anthropology 
as ethnographic writing, should be recognized as a con- 
tinuation of the fundamental ideological mystification 
central to the origins of the culture concept in German 
Romantic nationalism. "Culture" as nationalistic ideol- 
ogy served to sever consciousness of the unequal social 
roots of the new order of bourgeois political-economic 
domination by projecting it as an expression of universal 
ideal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity or, al- 
ternatively, of volkische Gemeinschaft, even as it ex- 
plicitly opposed the idealized concept of the new order 
to the obsolete social order of monarchical feudalism. 
The abstraction of ideal principles as cultural represen- 
tations of uniformly shared social qualities from mate- 
rial social relations and conditions and an almost Man- 
ichaean opposition of the former to the latter thus 
became a foundational principle of modern social con- 
sciousness, including nationalism and anthropological 
concepts of culture among its variant forms. The fright- 
ening resurgence of right-wing movements, both in Eu- 
rope and in America, based on forms of cultural funda- 
mentalism that mystify the real social causes of the 
discontent on which they feed should prompt anthropol- 
ogists to recognize the urgency of the need to develop a 
genuinely critical perspective on "culture" capable of 
revealing the continuity and interdependence of forms 
of social consciousness and the material social relations 
that give rise to them. 
WALTER P. ZENNER 
Department of Anthropology, State University of New 
York at Albany, Albany, N.Y. I2222, U.S.A. I I VII 94 
In her interesting analysis of the new "rhetorics of ex- 
clusion" in Western Europe, Stolcke limits herself to the 
response of respectable conservative political leaders to 
the new "extracommunitarian immigration" rather 
than dealing with "popular reactions and sentiments." 
She also links these ideological changes to the ways in 
which Britain and France in particular have absorbed 
immigrants in the past four decades and to the view 
of the "nation" in the two countries. The authoritative 
appeal to "cultural difference" rather than to race recalls 
a similar response by post-World War II imperialists. 
The late Melville J. Herskovits in his lectures referred 
to this as "culturalism," but Stolcke's "cultural funda- 
mentalism" is a more stylish rubric. 
While the notion of "new rhetorics of exclusion" can 
to some extent be applied to the United States, this must 
be done carefully. Stolcke's political reference to the 
right and to conservative liberals is limited to a Euro- 
pean context. The so-called right in the United States is 
split along several lines, including the "Christian right" 
and ex-liberal "neoconservatives." The latter include 
"environmental optimists" like Julian Simon and Ben 
Wattenberg who tend to favor open immigration. Those 
on the left may employ a "rhetoric of exclusion" of their 
own. Slogans of class conflict are an example of this, 
and Anglophobia and anti-Americanism are xenophobic 
views which have been used by both the left and the 
right. 
While I tend to agree with Stolcke that we should take 
the "nonracist" rhetoric of these "culturists" seriously, 
we must do so with care. Unlike anthropologists, politi- 
cians and ideologues have no all-embracing theory of 
culture. How do people acquire the "national conscious- 
ness" that they envision? Is it by early socialization, as 
the Boasians believe, or is acquisition practically biolog- 
ical? The former might be accomplished through limited 
immigration and assimilationist education, but the lat- 
ter would simply be racist. We should remember that 
many theorists have not internalized Franz Boas's gener- 
alization that there is no one-to-one relationship be- 
tween race, language, and culture. Racists like Sombart 
gave cultural as well as biological explanations for differ- 
ences between ethnic groups and nations. It is not hard 
to imagine that modern culturists do not exclude biolog- 
ical explanations but simply do not bring them to the 
fore. 
Of greater weight are two omissions by Stolcke. Her 
decision not to discuss popular anti-immigration senti- 
ment is unfortunate, since one can assume that political 
leaders find immigration a very fruitful issue to exploit. 
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The interaction between the political class and other 
classes on immigration feeds the resentment of immi- 
grants. It is also a test of a theoretical explanation of the 
importance of certain frames of economic problems. 
Stolcke tends to dismiss the social scientific study of 
ethnocentrism (xenophobia) by viewing it primarily as 
a component of a conservative ideology. She does not 
differentiate between the two. The fact that human be- 
ings may love and hate "other peoples" differentially 
and serially seems to prove that ethnocentrism is not 
a human universal. In this regard, her dismissal of the 
Bosnian case is particularly shallow. She refers to the 
fact that up to the present wars the various ethnic 
groups of that unfortunate land had good neighborly re- 
lations, without consideration of the long and compli- 
cated history of the Yugoslav lands. She also does not 
refer to sophisticated social scientific studies of xeno- 
phobia such as that conducted by Donald T. Campbell, 
Robert A. LeVine, and their associates, in which hypoth- 
eses derived from the Spencer-Sumner formulation of a 
universal syndrome of ethnocentrism were developed 
and tested cross-culturally. While the study was too 
broad to summarize here and too incomplete to support 
final conclusions, it is worth noting that ethnocentrism 
in this view begins with high self-regard, which in fairly 
intricate ways is tied to fear and hatred of some outsid- 
ers (LeVine and Campbell I972, Brewer and Campbell 
I976). 
I agree with Stolcke that we should try to understand 
the fluidity and flexibility of human ways of life and that 
the political meanings of cultural differences hould be 
a major focus of our work. It is easy to forget, however, 
that many of our professional forebears understood this. 
For instance, Herskovits, who was known as a principal 
proponent of cultural relativism, also showed how peo- 
ples of different background borrow and transform 
elements of each other's culture (Herskovits I964: 
i59-2i2). Edward Spicer (i980:287-362), as a result 
of his lifelong work on the Yaqui and the western 
U.S.-Mexican borderlands, showed how some ethnic 
boundaries are preserved in spite of great changes in cul- 
ture. The persistence of ethnic identity, in fact, is often 
inversely correlated with changes in culture. I thank 
Stolcke for challenging us to reconsider these questions. 
Reply 
VERENA STOLCKE 
Barcelona, Spain. 26 IX 94 
The resurgence of "racism" in contemporary Europe has 
generated a wealth of research that has enriched but also 
challenged traditional notions of racism. The categories 
applied to its classical period have proved insufficient 
to account for these new essentialist doctrines of exclu- 
sion. Central to this revision of earlier theorizations of 
"racism" is the gradual awareness that such doctrines 
form a paradoxical part of modernity rather than being 
an anachronism in modern society or a residue of their 
slave past-a point I have stressed since my early re- 
search on Igth-century Cuba (II974). As Goldberg 
(I993:4) has persuasively put it, "This is a central para- 
dox, the irony perhaps, of modernity: The more explic- 
itly universal modernity's commitments, the more open 
it is to and the more determined it is by the likes of 
racial specificity and racial exclusivity." Less clear, 
however, is the specific character of these new attitudes 
and rhetoric of exclusion and their roots, partly perhaps 
because of a certain difficulty in overcoming established 
notions of modern society, culture, identity, and racism 
itself. 
In view of the novelty and complexity of the phenom- 
enon, I have advisedly chosen to focus on only one mani- 
festation, namely, right-wing rhetorics of exclusion 
whose targets are extracommunitarian immigrants. The 
comments on my paper are not only most helpful in 
clarifying my definitions but also raise a number of per- 
tinent questions that, by going beyond the limited aims 
of my analysis, are useful for expanding anthropology's 
research agenda regarding the political and theoretical 
challenges posed by the new global disorder and espe- 
cially its ideological "overpinnings." 
I fully agree with Fitzpatrick's substantive observa- 
tion that cultural fundamentalists' postulated incom- 
mensurability of cultures is, in the end, nonsensical- 
though perhaps no less so than some of the postmodern 
radical-relativist ethnographic endeavours. Yet, ideolog- 
ical postulates do not have to have cognitive coherence 
to be politically effective. The integrationist strand in 
Cuban and Brazilian political racism which sustained a 
hierarchy of races but advocated miscegenation to over- 
come potential sociopolitical conflicts between the 
"races'' could also be considered untenable in a strict 
sense. In addition, it is no novelty that a notion, in this 
case incommensurability between cultures, may be put 
to different uses and have different meanings and conse- 
quences depending on socio-historical contexts. Cul- 
tural relativism, when it was first defended by Boas 
against racist and other ethnocentric determinisms, was 
progressive in the colonial context. In the contemporary 
crisis-ridden postcolonial world, radical cultural relativ- 
ism spells exclusion. As Taguieff has shown, moreover, 
the new right in France adopted the idea of incommen- 
surability instead of ordering cultures hierarchically to 
avoid the negative inegalitarian connotation of the lat- 
ter. In practice, cultural fundamentalism of course op- 
presses immigrants economically and socially, is applied 
only to subaltern strangers, and produces and reproduces 
inequality. Yet, as I argue, socioeconomic exclusion and 
inequality are now a consequence of immigration con- 
trols defended and implemented by conservatives and 
the right rather than being thematized in their rhetoric 
of exclusion. In theory, and again for the sake of argu- 
mentative coherence, the target is any extracommuni- 
tarian immigrant, but in practice it is the Third World 
poor whose exclusion is legitimated because it is they 
rather than, for example, an Arab oil magnate who are 
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seen as threatening social order in the context of eco- 
nomic recession. Stepick's observations on the con- 
trasting experience of Cuban and Haitian immigrants in 
Florida, though referring to the specific context of the 
United States, provide a suggestive example of the com- 
plex intersection between economic power and essen- 
tialist differentiation. 
Thatcher's famous statement is admittedly less 
clearly culturalist than I have wanted to make out, but 
the fact that the "people of the New Commonwealth" 
and of Pakistan, who are its targets, are phenotypically 
nonwhite is not sufficient reason to extrapolate racism 
from it. Instead of supposing that classical racism is at 
work every time those who are discriminated against 
are phenotypically different, we now need seriously to 
ask ourselves what is in a face nowadays. What does it 
mean, for example, that foreigners of North African ori- 
gin are systematically stopped by the French police 
searching for illegal immigrants because they have "the 
wrong face" (Dubet I989, cited by Silverman I992: I36)? 
There is, indeed, a growing awareness among scholars 
that contemporary European politics and policies of ex- 
clusion are informed by claims of nation. Nineteenth- 
century nationalism and late-2oth-century cultural fun- 
damentalism, as I have analyzed it, share the conflation 
of people-nation-territory. By contrast with igth- 
century typically hierarchical racist nationalism, 
however, contemporary cultural fundamentalism, by 
emphasizing cultural-national incommensurability, 
fragments the planet into separate universes rather than 
explicitly invoking underdevelopment on account of 
backwardness to deny that "we" have anything to do 
with the ever-growing inequality between "us" and 
"them" so as not to be taken for racists. Perhaps it needs 
stressing once more that to challenge racist reduc- 
tionisms in contemporary analyses of anti-immigrant 
rhetoric is in no way to minimize the horrors that this 
implies for "them." The extent to which racist catego- 
ries continue to shape people's attitudes even if they are 
not publicly admitted (Stepick) is a matter for research 
which above all must pay careful attention to argumen- 
tative structures in particular contexts and political tra- 
ditions. 
Benthall rightly points to the absence in my paper of 
an explanation of the North-South inequality that I cite 
as the "root cause" of cultural fundamentalism. But 
then, I suggest a more complicated set of dialectic inter- 
actions between ideological constructs and material rea- 
sons rather than a single "cause"-a dialectic between 
sociopolitical tensions generated by the economic reces- 
sion in advanced capitalist Europe and ideological scape- 
goating of extracommunitarian immigrants which is in- 
formed by new and old ideas of national entitlement, 
inclusion, and exclusion in the guise, for reasons of po- 
litical expediency, of a radically relativist culturalist id- 
iom. These times of economic crisis are evidently averse 
to progressive programs of change, but it seems equally 
evident that any piecemeal reform within prevailing 
structures of power and inequality will inevitably pro- 
duce new contradictions and tensions. Liberal capital- 
ism is inherently incapable of making everyone happy. 
Turner and Zenner regret that I have not discussed 
popular attitudes vis-a-vis immigrants. Turner's obser- 
vations qualifying and extending my analysis are espe- 
cially valuable. Of course, any theory of exclusion has 
its obverse, although it is often not recognized that iden- 
tity, be it ethnic, cultural, national, political, and/or of 
gender, is a relationship and logically always implies a 
contrasting other. Nationality rules, for example, at first 
sight are about the prerequisites for acquiring citizen- 
ship, that is, inclusion, in a state but implicitly of course 
also define who are noncitizens. Explicit emphases on 
exclusion or inclusion depend, however, on the "prob- 
lem" posed. Recent research on citizenship in relation 
to human rights, for example, in Latin America, has 
tended to be inward-looking, neglecting the conceptual- 
ization of nationality as its precondition. The alarm over 
extracommunitarian immigration in contemporary Eu- 
rope, by contrast, has enhanced the visibility of the for- 
eign "other" and the debate over politics of exclusion 
while, nonetheless, revitalizing commonsense under- 
standings of national belonging, identity, and citizen- 
ship rights. The postwar welfare state in Europe cer- 
tainly reinforced the populations' ideas of national 
entitlement which are now being eroded by economic 
recession. The ensuing frustrations are often but not 
necessarily always and by everyone directed against ex- 
tracommunitarian immigrants. Particular national his- 
tories complicate the picture. In the case of Spain, for 
example, the experience of emigration to France and 
Germany in the sixties of almost 3 million labouring 
men and women often serves as an antidote to anti- 
immigrant sentiments. One immigrant from Andalucia 
recently insisted to me, however, that he was not an 
immigrant but a forastero (roughly, "stranger," though 
the term precisely lacks the national connotation), obvi- 
ously seeking to distance himself from the stigma 
attached to extracommunitarian immigrants, although 
until very recently Andalucian immigrants were called 
and called themselves simply "immigrants." 
Much more complicated is, however, the way in 
which rhetorics of political elites interact with under- 
standings of the dominated majority of the population. 
The political success of the anti-immigrant platforms 
of the political right-to the extent that not only con- 
servative but also social-democratic governments have 
adopted an exclusionary rhetoric and policies-and the 
hostility and recurrent aggression against immigrants on 
the part of "ordinary people" provide ample evidence 
that neither are the politicians preaching in the desert 
nor is cultural fundamentalism merely a perverse fig- 
ment of the imagination of small extremist groups as, in 
fact, early reports on the resurgence of racism in Europe 
maintained. It is also well known that the production 
of an external enemy and threat generates internal socio- 
economic cohesion. The power of patriotism, especially 
during World War I, in bridging class divisions is only 
one example. Contemporary culture talk has, as Strath- 
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ern recently observed, contributed to obscuring society. 
To understand the politics of cultural fundamentalism 
we require much more detailed research on popular self- 
understandings regarding political-national and cultural 
identity and identifications. Central in this respect is 
a proper historical perspective that pays due attention 
precisely to the "dialogue" between ideologues and sub- 
altern sectors and to the economic context within which 
cultural fundamentalism flourishes. My hope is that my 
paper may stimulate investigations of this kind. The 
vast literature on the socioeconomic circumstances that 
gave rise to fascism may provide valuable insights here, 
but again one should beware of easy reductionisms. 
Turner and Strathern draw attention to the wide polit- 
ical spectrum that nowadays endorses or is receptive to 
cultural fundamentalist ideas in Europe of the kind I 
discuss, and Clemente rightly insists on the need to 
identify in more detail the tendencies within the right 
and the left. Multiculturalism is an important case in 
point, as are certain strands of defensive ethno- 
nationalism on the left. For example, in Catalunya, anti- 
statist nationalists of the extreme left may be heard ve- 
hemently defending national cultural identity as the 
only effective source of social cohesion in the contempo- 
rary aggressively individualist world; hence, they argue, 
extracommunitarian immigrants must assimilate. They 
entirely disregard, however, the fact that neoliberal capi- 
talist consumer society, by reinforcing individualism, 
fragments society and the consequences of this, as 
pointed out by Turner, and the fact that cultural identity 
and oppression are produced historically. 
An argued critique of contemporary cultural funda- 
mentalism, I believe, does not (as Clemente seems to 
think) preclude anthropological research into particular 
cultural processes and reinventions as long as this is 
not done (again, as Turner observes) in isolation from 
historical sociopolitical conditions. Of course, cultural 
identity does not produce xenophobia but rather the re- 
verse. That "everyone needs cultural 'roots"' is, how- 
ever, far too general a statement and prejudges the cru- 
cial issues regarding the prerequisites of identity and of 
the production of difference which anthropologists ur- 
gently need to investigate. 
I have limited myself to comparing France and Britain 
because I am aware of how important specific historical 
and contextual conditions and relations are in endowing 
sociopolitical processes with meaning. In this sense Italy 
strikes me as especially interesting considering its re- 
cent political history. Stepick and Zenner offer interest- 
ing comments from the vantage point of the United 
States. I would, however, be very hesitant to extend the 
notion of cultural fundamentalism without qualifica- 
tion to North America, not least because of its historical 
past in slavery and postemancipation racism. Boasian 
cultural anthropology was a momentous reaction to 
this. The opposition to nazism during World War II 
shaped in a dramatic fashion the refutation of racism as 
a legitimate intellectual and political stance. The civil 
rights struggles of the sixties contributed further to the 
replacement of the idea of "race" in differential dis- 
course by the obviously ambivalent term "ethnicity" 
and lately by "culture" (Barkan i992, Stolcke I993). The 
issue is not, however, only one of words but, as I have 
attempted to show, one of the assumptions and concep- 
tual structures of new culturalist rhetorics. 
The idea that humans are inherently ethnocentric is, 
as I argue, the naturalistic and hence universalist ideo- 
logical assumption on which contemporary European 
cultural fundamentalism is built. This does not mean 
that, as Zenner seems to think, I dismiss the study by 
the social sciences of ethnocentrism and xenophobia- 
nota bene, as historical phenomena. Anthropologists 
have traditionally investigated communities, peoples, or 
cultures as isolates. They may therefore be ill-equipped 
to offer insights into interrelationships between cul- 
tures, but we need urgently to incorporate a relational 
approach, not least to interrogate arlier social science 
formulations of a "universal syndrome of ethnocen- 
trism" which, for reasons I have spelled out, I regard as 
highly suspect. 
Finally, on the nation-state and its prospects: Benthall 
mentions the widespread idea among scholars that large 
nation-states may be less oppressive for minorities, but 
again this depends on the context. The United States, 
for example, does not appear to me to excel in its toler- 
ance with regard to its multiple "minorities." There are 
those who argue that transnational capitalism, by de- 
priving it of its traditional economic-political functions, 
spells doom for the nation-state. The European Commu- 
nity is celebrated as one outstanding example of this. 
Yet, while capital and commodities nowadays know no 
national frontiers, the movement of people is quite an- 
other matter. One crucial function of the nation-state, 
namely, controlling the movement of people across bor- 
ders, has been revitalized by the restructuring of indus- 
trial production. Industries may organize production 
across borders, seeking to reduce production costs and 
increase profits. But structural unemployment, espe- 
cially in the North, and its political consequences are 
deepening national divisions rather than dissolving bor- 
ders. Not even the foundational document of the new 
democratic postwar world order, the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, consecrates 
people's right to free choice of their residence. While 
"everyone has the right of freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of each state," movement 
between states is limited to the right to leave any coun- 
try, including one's own, and return to one's country. 
Nowadays, European citizens as workers cannot move 
completely freely within the European Community. Yet 
even those rights enjoyed by Europeans are denied alto- 
gether to long-settled residents who happen to be third- 
country nationals. Analyses often tend to pay attention 
to the flow of capital and goods to the neglect of that of 
people. Despite radically changed economic circum- 
stances, the problem posed by the formation of the mod- 
ern nation-state in the early igth century, how to bound 
the citizenry, remains with us. 
This content downloaded from 158.109.185.101 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 18:31:21 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2 | CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February I995 
My conclusion is admittedly utopian, but then, as 
Goya showed so powerfully in his caprichos, "Phantasy 
abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters: 
united with reason it is the mother of the arts and the 
origin of marvels." 
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